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When the Arab Spring began in late 2010 and continued into 2011, a rash of 
debate erupted in political science and international theory regarding the likelihood of a 
wave of liberal democracy spreading throughout the Middle East. As was the case with 
the fall of communism and the anticipated wave of liberal democracy, Arab Spring 
analysis mostly failed to capture or even acknowledge what a liberal democracy is or how 
it behaves, particularly in policies towards individual citizens. In the absence of 
widespread accepted theory regarding state domestic policies, the aim of this thesis is 
examine empirical data regarding Liberal and Realist theory in International Relations to 
help understand the relationship between today’s liberal democracies and their citizenry.  
The author combines empirical and theoretical research to uncover that liberal 
democracies today operate firmly within realist theory in both policy formation and 
practice. By identifying that liberal democracies operate today in line with realist theory, 
this thesis provides a series of considerations for United States policy makers and 
political scientists when analyzing, state currently considered to be liberal democracies, 
as well as those that are emerging. It offers areas of specific focus for U.S. policy makers to 
consider in terms of investing political and economic capital in encouraging liberal 
democracy. 
Within the context of the policies of liberal democracies toward their individual 
citizenry, the first chapter investigates realist theory and the nature of the relationship 
between the liberal democracy and human rights policies. Using empirical research, this 
chapter reveals that today’s liberal democracies represent realist theory and violate human 





policies towards internet freedom and exposes that, in line with realist theory, state interests 
have taken primacy over individual liberties. Lastly, the final chapter offers an in-depth 
examination of religious policy in liberal democracies by focusing on the decision-making 
process of two post-Soviet emerging liberal democracies. This chapter finds evidence 
supporting realist theory in terms of the state’s focus on preserving its own power over the 
protection of individual religious liberties. 
Thesis Advisors: 
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The Arab Spring began on December 17, 2010 when a 26-year-old roadside fresh 
fruits and vegetables salesman in rural Tunisia decided that he had enough of his own 
government’s oppression. Mohamed Bouazizi was, by all accounts, a quiet and friendly 
man whose only interest that day was earning enough money to support his widowed 
mother and six siblings.1 While preparing to sell his produce, Bouazizi was approached 
by a government inspector who asked Bouazizi to either produce a permit or a bribe if he 
wanted to continue with his business. When he refused, the inspector slapped him.2 
Publicly humiliated, Bouazizi elected to march down to the nearest municipal office and, 
in a now infamous single act of defiance, he set himself on fire.3 He died a few weeks 
later. The Tunisian population erupted in outrage and by January 14, 2011, the Tunisian 
government was overthrown.4  
In the immediate aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, predictions began to pour 
in from scholars of International Relations (IR) theory, attempting to predict what the 
impact of the Tunisian revolution would be. Most liberalists predicted that the Arab 
Spring would eventually result in the spread of a wave of liberal democracy across the 
Middle East, an area that previously had been largely resistant to any form of democracy 
at all.5 For the realist, on the other hand, the impact of the Arab Spring would be muted, 
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mostly because, rather than embracing liberal democracy, states would place greater 
emphasis on maintain power and would not bow to the international pressure that was a 
result of the turmoil that gripped Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and later Syria.6 What is most 
interesting about the analysis that followed the Arab Spring was that, in the rush to 
predict the chances of the spread of liberal democracy throughout the Middle East, little 
attention was paid to understanding what a liberal democracy even is today, and more 
importantly, how a liberal democracy behaves towards its own citizenry. You see, the 
relationship between the government and its citizenry was at the heart of the Arab Spring. 
It is what caused Mohamed Bouazizi to decide that he had no better option in front of 
himself, than death.  
To be clear, this thesis uses the questions surrounding the Arab Spring as the 
impetus for the research but is not an investigation of the Arab Spring itself. Here, we are 
interested in the broader questions with regard to theory and practice. Specifically, in IR 
theory today, liberalism and realism are two predominant schools of thought in terms of 
categorizing, explaining, and understanding why and how every state in the world 
operates in the global sphere. However, there are no widespread accepted theories to 
explain how each state in the world calculates its policies towards its own citizenry. 
Nothing solidly answers whether countries that are viewed as autocracies internationally 
really behave as autocracies in policies towards their own citizenry or whether liberal 
democracies actually enact domestic policies that are truly in line with how a liberal 
democracy is expected to operate. In the absence of such theories, this thesis sought to 
                                                          






uncover what is considered a liberal democracy today and how a liberal democracy 
operates in terms of its policies toward its citizenry using the existing liberalist and realist 
theory as a baseline and guidepost. 
It is incredibly important for U.S. policy and decision makers to understand what 
a liberal democracy is today and how one behaves because the U.S. is world’s foremost 
proponent of the global spread of liberal democracy. The U.S. spends countless dollars 
each year on a foreign policy, which the U.S. State Department declares is focused on 
promoting “democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity for the 
entire world; assist(ing) newly formed democracies in implementing democratic 
principles; assist(ing) democracy advocates around the world to establish vibrant 
democracies in their own countries; and identify(ing) and denounce(ing) regimes that 
deny their citizens the right to choose their leaders in elections that are free, fair, and 
transparent.”7 It is also important for policy makers to understand that, just because the 
state declares itself to be a liberal democracy, or is at least behaving like one in the 
international arena, its domestic policies might not necessarily reflect that status and that 
bears closer scrutiny. 
In The Democratic Century, Lipset and Lakin remarked that there are just about 
as many definitions of liberal democracy as there are scholars studying it.8 So began the 
challenge of this thesis. How is liberal democracy defined today? Some would probably 
simply identify a liberal democracy in much the same way as U.S. President Abraham 
                                                          
7 "Democracy." U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/. 
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Lincoln did: government which is “of, by, and for the people.”9 While this simplistic 
definition is indeed open to criticism, this thesis remedies the problem through the 
empirical data of one of the most widely used assessments of liberal democracy, the 
annual global survey conducted by the U.S.-based independent watchdog organization, 
Freedom House but also by crosschecking that survey with data available from the Polity 
Project, an independent organization founded by Political Science Professor Ted Gurr, 
formerly of George Mason University and the University of Maryland. The Freedom 
House annual survey evaluates individual nation policies and practices toward civil 
liberties, political rights, and election processes and grades each nation using a scale of 
'free,' 'partly free,' and 'not free' to grade countries on democracy.10 The Freedom House 
dataset is widely used as a data source for empirical academic research because the 
methodology and data is freely accessible, peer-reviewed, non-partisan, and independent. 
The Freedom House data is not without its critics, who question whether western political 
science experts might be inherently biased.11 Nevertheless, Freedom House makes the 
data available, subjected to independent study and critique, and is still one of the most 
complete sources available for measuring a state’s governance. One important note to 
make with regards to Freedom House research is the distinction between electoral 
democracy and liberal democracy. The Freedom House methodology explained that 
“Freedom House’s term “electoral democracy” differs from “liberal democracy” in that 
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Democratic Societies." In Law, State and Religion in the New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 71 
10 "Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology." Freedom House. November 1, 2014. Accessed November 
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the latter also implies “the presence of a substantial array of civil liberties.”12 In their 
published findings, Freedom House further explains that ‘Free’ counties are considered 
liberal democracies and they are all electoral democracies.13 Some ‘Partly Free’ countries 
might be electoral democracies, but they are not liberal democracies. The Polity data 
ranks countries on a scale that ranges from “strongly autocratic” to “strongly 
democratic”. While the Polity project ranking data was comprehensive and did not differ 
significantly from the data from Freedom House, there was no clear way to delineate 
liberal democracies from within the data from those which might be called democratic or 
strongly democratic so, the Freedom House data identifying a total of 88 liberal 
democracies around the world was used throughout this thesis. 
The case studies were selected for this thesis based on a careful examination of 
the policy areas might best represent state policies towards its own citizenry. Chapter 1 
focuses on liberal democracy policies towards human rights, these are the broad set of 
rights, whether civil or political, economic, social or cultural, that are viewed as inherent 
to all human beings. 14 The presence of the protection of these rights in policy and in law 
are often viewed as an absolute requirement for liberal democracies. Because the focus of 
this thesis is on the policies of liberal democracies today, Chapter 2 investigates liberal 
democracy policies toward, what is perhaps the newest area of policy and law 
development, the internet. And finally, Chapter 3 examines liberal democracy policies 
on, what is perhaps the longest running and most contentious area of policy formation, 
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13 Ibid. 
14 "What Are Human Rights?". United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 





religion. Because Chapters 1 and 2 were focused broadly on understanding the current 
application of state policies, Chapter 3 specifically looks at how and why the policy is 
crafted by focusing on two post-Soviet states that are navigating the transition to liberal 
democracy. The idea was to get a sense of, not just the policies that are in place in a 
liberal democracy, but how they come into being, and how that impacts the state’s 
journey towards being fully recognized as a liberal democracy. 
In Chapter 1, a total of 88 countries around the world, which both Freedom House 
and Polity Project data agreed were liberal democracies as of 2013, were studied in terms 
of their policies and practices towards overall human rights.  To measure how countries 
are behaving around the world, an empirical dataset widely used in academic research 
called the Political Terror Scale (PTS) was selected. The data used to populate the PTS 
index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty 
International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
15 The PTS scale uses a 1 to 5 numerical grading scale in terms of assessing a state’s 
domestic human rights policies and record. States achieving a score of 1 on the PTS are 
judged to have minimal violations of human rights and correspondingly strong laws and 
procedures to protect human rights while states achieving a score of 5 are viewed as 
willfully violating human rights in both policy and in practice. Chapter 1 found that, of 
the liberal democracies that were under consideration in this study, a total of 9 of them 
had score of 3 or above of the PTS scale, meaning those states were judged to have at 
least a moderate level of serious human rights violations in policy and practice.  Even 
                                                          
15 Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney. "Political Terror Scale : About." Political Terror Scale. February 21, 





more alarming, 5 of those liberal democracies-- Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Israel, and 
South Africa--were judged to be close to severe violators of human rights. The key 
finding of this analysis of data is that, as of 2013, not all liberal democracies are 
observant of human rights policies and practices to the extent that liberal democratic 
theorists would have predicted or expected. A review of the policies of the 5 states found 
that, in line with realist theory, the human rights violations benefited the state and the 
ruling majority, of the time. In other words, the state chose to ignore or perhaps even 
violate at least some human rights to benefit in such a way that it helped secure the 
position of the majority and governing authority.    
Next, with the proliferation of the internet, a flurry of scholarly debate erupted 
regarding what the relationship between the internet policy and liberal democracy. 
Chapter 2 used the Freedom House Freedom in the World dataset to again identify the 88 
countries around the world that are viewed as liberal democracies. The Freedom House 
data was also compared to the Polity IV project dataset, but because the two did not differ 
significantly, the Freedom House data was selected because of its comprehensiveness. 
Chapter 2 had the added complication of having to narrow the liberal democracies under 
consideration based on internet access and penetration. Essentially, there was no reason 
to study liberal democracy policies on the internet if, because of limitations such as 
economic or infrastructure, the population did not have access to the internet. Data from 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations organization that 
measures internet penetration, was used to narrow the list of liberal democracies under 
consideration. Chapter 2 found that three liberal democracies--Brazil, India, and South 





theorists.16 The conclusion was that liberal democracies appear to use the same controls, 
in accordance with the interests that influenced restrictions on traditional media which, as 
realists argue, fortify the state’s existing societal divisions, including social relationship 
and class, both domestically and internationally. 
And, because state policies emerge over time, Chapter 3 specifically sought to 
investigate that process by looking at states that were transitioning to liberal democracy 
to understand how policy is formulated and what impact those policies have on the liberal 
democracy itself. Chapter 3 focused on the formation of religious policy by Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan following the fall of the Soviet Union to compare Uzbekistan’s path to 
autocracy with Kygryzstan’s struggle to transition to liberal democracy. As controls, it 
was important that the investigation focus on two states with similar backgrounds and 
populations. It was equally important that the states also be forming in the same time 
period, in the same region, so as to avoid uneven comparison influenced by what could 
be unequal outside global trend influences. Additionally, there needed to be evidence that 
religion ought to be investigated as having a role during the transition to democracy. 
Chapter 3 used Freedom House data to identify the states transitioning to democracy in 
the post-Soviet era. Most fascinating was that Kyrgyzstan presented a rather unique 
example of a state transitioning to liberal democracy while Uzbekistan solidified 
autocracy. Both states began their path to independence at the same time with the fall of 
the Soviet Union but also had to make religious policy decisions after having been part of 
a larger nation, which had seen little tolerance of or need for religion at all.  Chapter 3 
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found that, in keeping with realist theory, state policy over religion can lead to real abuse 
of power in the name of regime survival or national security. Moreover, the chapter found 
that state suppression of religion leads to instability and even a recoil from democracy to 
autocracy, as evidenced by Uzbekistan. Referencing the case of Uzbekistan in particular, 
it almost seemed that at the very instance there appeared to be a religious-based threat to 
the regime, any hint of progress towards a democratic transition appeared to reverse and 
the institutions of the former Soviet system began to re-emerge. In the case of 
Kyrgyzstan, it was only with the complete removal of the “old guard” regime that the 
transition to democracy was judged to be progressing steadily and policies toward 
religion fell more in line with liberal democracy.   
Finally, the research contained in this thesis fits within the broader context of 
theory that has been crafted for international relations but offers a new area of focus and 
consideration by looking at the theories in relation to state behavior in domestic policy as 
well. The thesis investigated the modern perceptions of liberal democracy and used data 
to identify the states that are considered to be liberal democracies and assessed the policy 
and practices of liberal democracies toward their own populations. The originality of the 
research is that it considered existing theory but applied it in a new and interesting way. 
The conclusion reached was that modern liberal democracies operate within realist 
prediction for state behavior in relation to domestic policy formation. Follow-on research 
is encouraged to continue to investigate this possible linkage and to approach the research 
by expanding the focus to look at other areas such as the domestic economic policies of 
liberal democracies or to look at other forms of governance such as autocracies to 





Chapter 1: The Relationship between Humans Rights and Liberal Democracy: Empirical 
Evidence to Support Liberal or Realist Theory? 
 
Introduction  
The United States is the global proponent of liberal democracy and it contributes 
a significant amount of political and financial resources towards encouraging the spread 
of liberal democracy throughout the world. Understanding the health of the liberal 
democratic state helps policy makers decide which countries around the world require 
more focus, in terms of political and financial resources, to ensuring the continued 
practice of liberal democracy. For the U.S., a key element of the advocacy of liberal 
democracy is ensuring the protection of human rights. The U.S. maintains visibility on 
human rights policies around the world, focusing not just on the human rights policies of 
liberal democracies but also on the policies of autocracies and other forms of 
government. It accomplishes this monitoring through several initiatives including 
charging diplomats abroad to report on host-nation human rights policies and also 
through participation in the United Nations Human Rights Council. Because the U.S. 
views the theoretical linkages between human rights and liberal democracy strongly 
enough to devote U.S. State Department resources toward monitoring human rights, it is 
equally important for U.S. policy makers to recognize what the relationship between 
human rights and liberal democracy commitment is. By understanding the relationship 
between human rights and liberal democracy, policy makers will be better prepared in 
terms of identifying areas to spend political and economic capital to effect human rights 





In a review of published U.S. State Department messaging on human rights 
through 2014, is not clear is whether the U.S. measures commitment to human rights 
from the liberalist or realist perspective. 17 The issue here is that theorists are not in 
agreement with regards to the specific manifestations of human rights policies that states 
should have in order to be considered liberal democracies. In fact, some theorists argue 
that human rights are not an essential element of a liberal democracy at all. Realists, for 
example, hold that liberal democracies will have varying forms of human rights policies, 
which are dictated by the politics of the day in each country. Liberalists, on the other 
hand, argue that in a liberal democracy, the policies the state has on human rights will 
reflect the belief that all individuals are born with the equal rights, that the state will not 
infringe on the inalienable rights of the individual, and that the states will only do what is 
minimally necessary to protect the rights of individuals. 
In this paper, I investigate whether there is evidence to support the liberalist or 
realist perspective on the necessary human rights policies of liberal democracies. I will 
first describe the theoretical arguments regarding the linkages between liberal democracy 
and human rights from the liberal and realist point of view. I will then look for empirical 
evidence that will demonstrate which theory is actually in practice in today’s liberal 
democracies.  My thesis is that liberal democratic human rights policies today are 
reflective of the realist point of view in that, while human rights policies are an important 
element for a healthy liberal democracy, human rights policies of liberal democracies 
                                                          










differ greatly based on each state’s internal politics. I believe that some liberal 
democracies actually infringe on human rights quite dramatically and do not view 
individual rights equally.  By identifying these countries, I’ll be able to recommend the 
states where policy makers should consider focusing additional political and financial 
resources towards ensuring the health and continued spread of liberal democracy. 
 
Literature Review 
Perhaps the foremost International Relations theorist in terms of the relationship 
between liberal democracy and human rights policies was Jürgen Habermas. It is 
important to note that we have chosen Habermas as the representative theorist for the 
liberalist perspective on the relationship between human rights and democracy but he is 
not alone, Habermas used a body of scholarly work in support of his theory, see the 
foundational works of John Rawls18 and more recent work by J. Pederson19, for example. 
Habermas argued essentially that human rights and liberal democratic governance 
have an intrinsic codependency. Basic human rights, according to Habermas, are a part of 
the concept of democracy itself because democracy is the “process of self-legislation.”20 
In other words, a democracy, liberal or otherwise, could not be formed without 
individuals already having and exercising their individual liberty to represent themselves 
in the formulation of ideas, the debate of those ideas, and the acceptance of the 
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impending or established law. The argument is that, if individuals were not able to 
represent themselves or choose their representation, the practice of democracy would not 
exist. To paraphrase, Habermas has acknowledged that his argument begs the question of 
which comes first the democracy, or the recognition of basic human rights?21 This 
dilemma resembles the age old question of which came first, the chicken or the egg? 
Habermas explained that “in a certain way, we consider both principles as equally 
original. One is not possible without the other, but neither sets limits on the other.”22 To 
put it another way, consider that democracy is not in practice if individuals are not 
participating but, in order for the individual to participate, one has to have embraced the 
concept of individual autonomies or basic human rights. The idea is then that the 
democracy cannot place limits on the individual human rights and the individual human 
rights cannot limit the democracy.  
Certainly, Habermas’ theory requires a bit more analysis. For one, readers today 
might immediately object to Habermas by questioning how, if democracy and human 
rights are so codependent, could standard-bearer liberal democracies such as the U.S., the 
U.K., France, and Germany be struggling so much with laws that essentially undermine 
basic human rights? In the U.S., one has to look no further than the current debate on the 
legality of gay marriage to question whether liberal democracy and basic human rights 
are indeed so codependent. At the heart of the gay marriage debate is whether the 
majority can, based on its own set of beliefs and idea of morality, set in place laws and 
conditions that essentially oppress the rights of a minority. After all, states have actually 
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passed laws and even held propositional votes, to determine whether the majority believe 
that minority possesses the same basic human rights as themselves. On the same 
question, the U.K., has felt it necessary to pass a federal law that specifically recognizes 
gay marriage, as if the right to marry as the exercise of the concept of self-determination, 
did not already exist in the democratic framework of the nation. 
Habermas would contend that a democracy is a “tradition-building project” and as 
such, “the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative 
substance of the system of rights laid down in the original document of the 
constitution.”23 For Habermas, the framework of democracy itself sets forth the 
conditions for rectifying injustices in human rights in what otherwise might be considered 
an infringement on democracy. In other words, democracy provides the ability for 
individuals to use their own individual autonomy to correct infringements on human 
rights. Here again, we view this exercise of autonomy, as it exists in the codependency 
and coexistence of the relationship human rights and democracy. Habermas does caution 
that “this fallible continuation of the founding event can break out of the circle of a 
polity’s groundless discursive self-constitution only if this process—which is not immune 
to contingent interruptions and historical regressions—can be understood in the long run 
as a self-correcting learning process.”24 This means that individual human rights are 
continuously present within the liberal democratic system, which provides an inherent 
mechanism for reassessing and adapting governing legislations in the context of the 
contemporary environment of the state. Habermas concludes that, within the democratic 
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state, individuals “hitherto discriminated against gain their own voice and that hitherto 
underprivileged classes are put into a position to take their fate into their own hands. 
Once the interpretive battles have subsided, all parties recognize that the reforms are 
achievements, although they were at first sharply contested.”25 In terms of foreign policy  
On the other hand, for realists, the relationship between human rights and 
democracy is less complex and even less controversial. Realists see power and security as 
having primacy in the motivations of the state and therefore, human rights are viewed in 
that context. According to realist standard-bearer Thucydides, “men are motivated by 
honor, greed, and, above all, fear.”26 To be clear, realists do not totally dismiss the 
nobility of human rights and they do not deny the moral relevance of human rights, realist 
theory simply argues that whatever policy the state choses - and specific to our interest is 
the human rights policies that the liberal democracy might choose – it must be viewed in 
the context of the state’s perception of the relationship between that policy and the state’s 
power and security.27 So, in terms of the specific human rights policies in a liberal 
democracy, the realist view is that “in the world as it is, the final arbiter of things political 
is power.”28 
The core argument in the realist perspective is that, as Thucydides can be 
paraphrased, in society the strong rule the weak because they have the authority to do 
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so.29 Reviews of subsequent realist theory reveal that, although less harsh concepts often 
appear, Thucydides’ principle is foundational.30 Prominent realism theorist Thomas 
Hobbes, for example, takes a more careful and nuanced approach to realism by applying 
the condition of reason in the decision-making calculus of the state, claiming essentially 
that individuals are equal in strength and desires, there is certainty that “the general rule 
of reason” will be followed as long as one’s own security is not endangered.31 To apply 
the realist theory to human rights in a liberal democracy, one could assume that the 
elected representation could easily grant equal rights to the minority as long as the effect 
of those rights do not have the appearance or the reciprocating effect of weakening or 
threatening the majority or the power brokers of the state. This is to emphasize that the 
power to make the decision to grant rights is held by the powerful and the decision is 
made within the confines of what is perceived by those in power to be reasonable and by 
extension, not threatening. 
Additionally, Hobbes felt that the granting of rights by the majority to the 
minority held a certain motive, which drives how reason is interpreted by the majority. 
According to Hobbes, when one “transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in 
consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he 
hopeth for thereby.”32 The premise is that when the state acknowledges an individual 
right, it does so because it has reasonably calculated that the acknowledgement of the 
                                                          
29 Mareike Oldemeinen. "The Political Realism of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes." International 




32 Thomas Hobbes. "The Leviathan: Chapter XIII of the Natural Condition of Mankind Concerning Their 






right will benefit the state in some regard. In terms of international relations, there could 
be both domestic and international benefits for the state in acknowledging a particular 
human right. For example, a liberal democracy’s elected ruling majority might find it 
beneficial to grant women the right to vote because, in doing so, the assessment will have 
been made that women will feel loyalty toward the ruling majority for granting that right, 
thus solidifying the position and security of the ruling majority. Internationally, the 
benefit to the ruling majority will have calculated that granting women the right to vote 
will become a tool that can be used to undermine the political support of a competing 
state’s regime that does not allow women to vote, thus weakening that state. 
To be clear, the realist perspective delineates itself from the liberalist perspective 
with regard to the focus of a liberal democracy in terms of lawmaking. While liberalists 
view liberal democratic law as a positive force that is be designed with the individual in 
mind - succinctly meaning individualistic - the focus, for realists, in crafting law is on the 
state’s interests.33 In other words, the realist theorizes that because of the nature of 
democratic process, the elected representation does not focus its attention on individual 
citizens when crafting laws. The representatives, instead, place the protection of the state 
as paramount to the protection of the individual. In essence, in a liberal democracy, the 
realist would argue that the state would only enact human rights legislation that would 
not disrupt the security of the state. 
 To understand the realist theory in practice, consider the issues of interracial 
marriage and same-sex marriage. From the liberalist perspective, one would expect that a 
                                                          





liberal democracy, viewing individual rights with primacy, would not place restrictions or 
limitations on a minority of individuals to be married to whomever he or she chooses. It 
is easy for even the casual observer to recall that, even in the stalwart liberal democracies 
such as the U.S., UK, and France, the individual’s right to marry was not protected by the 
state and to this day, still is not protected by law in a majority of U.S. states. Instead, in 
line with the realist perspective, laws on individual rights favor the majority over the 
minority, and in doing so insulate the state (and in this case, the elected representation) 
from potential upheaval by the majority. Certainly, Habermas and the liberalists would 
argue that we are viewing this issue through the lens of a moment in time and that the 
liberal democracies will grow and eventually adapt their laws to realize the full rights of 
the individual minority. This argument is quickly dispensed however by the realist 
perspective, which argues that the liberal democracy will only adapt laws to realize the 
rights of the minority when it benefits the state and elected representation.  
 Moreover, if human rights are codependent and co-original in liberal democracy 
as liberalists would suggest, why would liberal democracies even have laws that clearly 
favor majority rights over minority rights at any given time? The answer, in the realist 
perspective, is that those laws benefited the security of the state at the given time. Any 
observer can easily recall that this scenario has repeated itself time and time again 
throughout history. Whether one is to consider the rights of blacks to be treated equal to 
whites in the U.S., the right of women to vote in Switzerland (which was not granted 
until 1971 despite Switzerland having been a liberal democracy essentially since 1848)34, 
                                                          






or the rights of gays and lesbians to have employment in the UK (which was not 
protected until the late 1990s)35.  
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
 The thesis here is that liberal democratic human rights policies today are 
reflective of the realist point of view in that, while human rights policies are an important 
element for a healthy liberal democracy, the individual policies of liberal democracies 
differ greatly based on each state’s internal politics with the security of the state 
paramount to the individual. I believe that the evidence will show that some liberal 
democracies actually infringe on human rights and moreover, liberal democracies do not 
view individual human rights equally. 
 
Methodology 
The business now turns to uncovering what empirical evidence exists today, 
which can help us understand whether the liberalist or realist view is actually in practice 
in relation to today’s liberal democracies. First, we must define how a liberal democracy 
is viewed in today’s terms. When looking around the world, it is probably fairly easy to 
identify at least a handful of states that one could reasonably assume are liberal 
democracies. We have already mentioned the U.S., UK, and France earlier in this paper 
but certainly one might also think of Canada or perhaps Germany or Australia. For the 
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scope of this paper we are limited by available time and resources and will seek 
assistance from a couple of well-established and credible sources to establish the 
recognized liberal democracies of today. 
To be frank, a liberal democracy is a rather nuanced and complex conglomerate 
form of ideas, policies, governance, and behavior. Great criticism is often applied to 
scholarly studies that oversimplify the definition of liberal democracy but to be fair there 
are volumes of theory and empirical research that have been published and, at this point, 
it is reasonable to glean some of the key elements of that scholarly work to define the 
liberal democracy. This research recognizes a liberal democracy as a state that is 
democratically ruled by a government that is accountable to the general population and 
where political liberties are recognized and protected through established constitutional 
law. The independent monitoring group Freedom House has simply defined a liberal 
democracy as an electoral democracy that protects civil liberties.36 These definitions 
obviously run short because the immediate questions become what political liberties are 
recognized and to what extent are those liberties protected through law?  
For a more compressive look at what the liberal democracies are around the 
world, the approach has been to look at the 2014 published data from Freedom House 
regarding form of governance and cross examine that data with the 2014 data compiled 
by the Polity Project. Polity is a project undertaken by a team of researchers led by 
Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole that ranks countries on a scale ranging from 
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“strongly autocratic” to “strongly democratic”.37 Freedom House and the Polity Project 
both make their datasets and methodology readily accessible and open to additional 
research and peer review, making the data ideal for inclusion here. It was decided to 
combine the datasets of both Freedom House and the Polity Project for this research to 
leave us with one collective data set. In their published findings, Freedom House 
explained that all of the countries it has graded as ‘Free’ counties are liberal democracies 
and they note that all of those countries are electoral democracies. Some ‘Partly Free’ 
countries might be electoral democracies, but they are not liberal democracies.38 The 
Polity Project labels liberal democracies as ‘DEM’, meaning “fully institutionalized 
democracy” but the Polity Project stops short of labeling those countries as liberal 
democracies so the data was compared to the Freedom House data, paying particular 
attention to discrepancies.39 
Of the 196 countries rated by Freedom House, there were 31 countries that the 
Polity Project did not assign scores to and those countries have been excluded from the 
study because the data could not be collated. (The full list of countries under 
consideration are listed in the combined dataset, available in Appendix 1). In most cases, 
the Polity Project did not assess the countries that were currently involved in a civil war, 
lacked an established government, or whose population size was less than 1 million - 
usually small island nations.  
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The combined datasets revealed 32 discrepancies. Specifically, there were 31 
instances where the Polity Project rated a country as a fully institutionalized democracy 
but Freedom House did not consider the country to be a liberal democracy. There was 
only 1 instance, that of Suriname, where Freedom House considered a country a liberal 
democracy where the Polity Project did not consider Suriname to be a fully 
institutionalized democracy. A full list of the discrepancies is below: 
Albania Guatemala Liberia Nicaragua Suriname 
Bolivia Honduras Macedonia Niger Thailand 
Burundi Indonesia Malawi Pakistan Turkey 
Colombia Kenya Malaysia Paraguay Ukraine 
Comoros Kosovo Mexico Philippines   
East Timor Kyrgyzstan Moldova Sierra Leone   
Georgia Lebanon  Nepal Solomon Islands   
 
A detailed analysis revealed that the discrepancies emerged between the Freedom 
House and Polity Project data sets because of the weight Polity assigned to the 
established form of government. In all cases, except Suriname, the Polity Project gave 
more weight to countries that had an electoral form of government. Upon closer 
inspection however, the discrepancies are easily explained. While Freedom House did not 
recognize the 31 countries as liberal democracies, the Polity Project gave them high 
marks for being an electoral democracy but caveated that 29 of these countries were 
viewed as being either fragile or moderately fragile in terms of their legitimacy. In other 
words, the Freedom House data is accurate in not considering the countries as liberal 
democracies because, as the Polity Project data also confirms, the actual practice of 
liberal democracy in those countries is precarious given the instability of the central 
government. The remaining 3 countries, Bolivia, Indonesia, and Turkey, which were 





having very weak checks and balances on the chief executive and that matches the 
reasoning that Freedom House did not grade them as full liberal democracies.  
Finally, the discrepancy involving Suriname, is the only outlier in the dataset. In 
this case, Freedom House actually considers Suriname to be a full-fledged liberal 
democracy where the Polity Project does not. The issue here appears to be the weights 
given to economic legitimacy. While Freedom House notes Suriname’s issues with public 
corruption, it judged the central government as having enough checks and balances in the 
established rule of law to grade Suriname as a liberal democracy. The Polity Project, 
however, weighted the public corruption more heavily and thus placed doubts on the 
stability of Suriname’s central government, assigning it a grade less than a full-fledged 
liberal democracy. Because of this discrepancy, Suriname has been excluded from 
consideration for this study.  
The combined datasets, leave a total of 88 countries around the world that are 
considered liberal democracies, as of 2014. The following is the complete list of the 
liberal democracies, where both Freedom House and Polity Project data agree, and are 
thus under consideration for this study: 
Andorra Benin Czech Rep Greece Japan Mauritius Palau São Tomé  Taiwan 
Antigua 
Barbuda Botswana Denmark Grenada Kiribati Micronesia Panama Senegal Tonga 
Argentina Brazil Dominica Guyana Latvia Monaco Poland Serbia Trinidad  
Australia Bulgaria Dominican Hungary Lesotho Mongolia Portugal Slovakia Tuvalu 
Austria Canada El Salvador Iceland Liechtenstein Montenegro Romania Slovenia U.K. 
Bahamas 
Cape 
Verde Estonia India Lithuania Namibia 
St Kitts 
Nevis South Africa U.S. 
Barbados Chile Finland Ireland Luxembourg Nauru St Lucia South Korea Uruguay 
Belgium Costa Rica France Israel Malta Netherlands St Vincent  Spain Vanuatu 
Belize Croatia Germany Italy Marshall Is. New Zealand Samoa Sweden  






For the data looking specifically at Human Rights policies and record, there are 
two data sets of empirical data that are most frequently utilized in Human Rights policy 
research. The first is the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, which contains standards-based 
quantitative information on the government policies toward human rights of 202 
countries through 2011.40 The second data set is called the Political Terror Scale (PTS), 
which is “measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a 
particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. 
The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly 
country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices.”41 PTS data is available from 1976-2013. 
Previous research has argued that CIRI data and PTS data give an incomplete 
account of the true status of an individual country’s human rights policies and practices.42 
Neil Mitchell and Bronia Naomi Flett, for example, found that neither data set does an 
adequate job of distinguishing from individual and state violations. 43 In other words, the 
data is not sophisticated enough to truly distinguish whether the violations of human 
rights are occurring because of an internal issue at a local level rather than occurring 
because of a concerted government effort. Unfortunately, the shortcomings of the data 
sets are not easily rectified particularly because in most cases that sort of data is not 
available. Understanding the decision making apparatus of a government to determine 
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real intent falls in the realm of intelligence work and not scholarly research. Mitchell and 
Flett acknowledged that, while considerable progress has been made in recent years 
toward human rights research, the gap still remains that the data simply does not allow 
for a linkage to accountability.44 So, the problem persists in that there is an identified gap 
in the measurement of human rights policy monitoring, however, there is no easy solution 
for academics. The data is also limited in that it takes considerable time to compile and 
the CIRI data set in particular is becoming outdated since the latest measurements of state 
human rights policies are only current through 2011. This, unfortunately, means that the 
PTS data set is the only mostly current data set, with calculations complete through 2013 
however, there is no independent data set to compare the PTS data to. With the 
limitations to the datasets and acknowledged and understood, the decision was made to 
include the 2013 PTS data in the analysis but to adjust the Freedom House and Polity 
Project datasets for liberal democracies to also correspond with the year 2013. 
Fortunately, there have not been massive shifts in liberal democratic governance 
between 2013 and 2015. According to a correlated data comparison of Freedom House 
and Polity Project data for 2015 and 2013, there were 3 states that were judged to be 
liberal democracies in 2013 that were not viewed as liberal democracies in 2015: 
Indonesia, Peru, and Suriname. And, there were 2 liberal democracies as of 2015 that 
were not liberal democracies in 2013: Mauritania and Zambia.  
                                                          





Additionally, there 13 states, of the 90 total liberal democracies, where no human 
rights data was available in the PTS data set and those are marked in gray in Figure 2 
below: 
 
 Another issue arose in that the 2013 PTS data was only partially complete. That is 
to say that, while previous annual data included a correlation of U.S. State Department 
data and Amnesty International data, the 2013 data only included U.S. State Department 
data. To account for this issue, a review of the 2012 complete PTS data was conducted 
and revealed that there were no large discrepancies. The grades given to liberal 
democracy human rights policies and practices were very similar, only differing by a 
point in a few cases. Still, this incomplete data is noted and was accounted for, but it was 
not expected to change the results of this study in any meaningful way since previous 
annual data was sufficiently similar. 
 As briefly mentioned before, the PTS scale uses a 1 to 5 numerical grading scale 
in terms of human rights record and policies. It should be noted that the PTS scale was 
first developed in the 1980s, which was before terror was so often affiliated with 
fundamentalist act. The “terror” in the name of PTS refers to egregious human rights 
violations such as “the state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political 
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Antigua and BarbudaBotswana Denmark Grenada Japan Micronesia Panama São Tomé and PríncipeSwitzerland
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Bangladesh Chile Finland IndonesiaLithuania Nauru St Kitts and Nevis South Africa United Kingdom
Barbados Costa Rica France Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands St Lucia South Korea United States
Belgium Croatia Germany Israel Malta New Zealand St Vincent and GrenadinesSpain Uruguay





imprisonment that the Political Terror Scale measures.”45 Below is an explanation of the 
rankings used in the PTS data: 
 
Political Terror Scale Levels 
 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no 
limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological 
goals. 
 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of 
its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or 
ideas. 
 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. 
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited 
detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political 
murder is rare. 
 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and 
torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
Source: Wood, Reed M., and Mark Gibney. "Political Terror Scale : Data." Political Terror Scale. February 21, 2015. 
Accessed February 27, 2015. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php 
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 PTS data also includes a column of information derived from the World Bank, 
which lists countries according to per capita income, ranging from High Income (HI), to 
Upper Middle Income (UMI) to Lower Middle Income (LMI), and finally to Low-
Income (LI). While not explicitly stated in the PTS data, the idea of including a grade for 
per capita income is that it would also allow researchers to look at whether there might be 
any difference or commonalities between countries that had similar wealth and standard 
of living. Since per capita income is the measure of gross domestic income divided by the 
total population, this provides a quick reference for the general wealth of the population. 
Of course, it should be noted that per capita income is an entirely nuanced study but the 
point of acknowledgement and inclusion here is just an added marker of comparing and 
differentiating countries. 
To account for the incomplete data in the 2013 PTS, it was decided that this study 
would break the PTS grading scale into 2 categories, 1 to 2 and 3 to 5. In this way we are 
accounting for the incomplete data and allowing for deviation. States with PTS grades 1 
and 2 are largely considered to recognize and practice human rights policy in a way that 
would be mostly consistent with liberal democracy. If a state received a 3 or higher on 
the PTS scale, these states are judged to have or employ human rights policies and 
practices that are contrary to liberal democracy, and indeed contrary to liberal democratic 








Data and Analysis 
 The analysis of the combined PTS and liberal democracy data presented some 
interesting findings. (The complete data set is available in Appendix 1) First, there were 
actually 9 liberal democracies, whose human rights policies and practices actually 
holistically. That is to say that of the 77 liberal democracies that were under 
consideration in this study, 9 of them had score of 3 or above of the PTS scale meaning 
those states were judged to have at least a moderate level of serious human rights 
violations.  Even more alarming, of the 9 liberal democracies, 5 of them were judged to 
be close to severe violators of human rights.  
The 5 countries that received a grade of 4 on the PTS were Bangladesh, Brazil, 
India, Israel, and South Africa. It should be noted that for Bangladesh and South Africa, 
the PTS tabulation of Amnesty International data from 2012 graded them at 3 while the 
PTS tabulation of 2013 U.S. State Department’s score data graded them at 4. Looking at 
the PTS data for Bangladesh and South Africa going back to 1976, the State Department 
and Amnesty International PTS scores always realign within a year, suggesting that there 
might be a slight deviation in the scores based on the time of the year that the data was 
finalized. In any case, we feel it is safe to assume that the PTS Amnesty International 
score, if it had been recorded in 2013, would have probably aligned with the PTS State 
Department score. The score of 4 for these 5 countries, according to the PTS data, reveals 
that in each of them there are large portions of the population experiencing violations of 
civil and political rights. Often this involves targeted and even widespread arrests of 
political dissidents as well as other forms of intimidation be the state to discourage 





scores reveal that the citizenry is often not treated fairly in the judiciary branch which 
further limits opposition challenges to authority.  One other interesting factor arose in the 
data and that was in terms of the income level of the states. There was essentially no 
commonality in terms of the wealth of the population. The majority of the population of 
Bangladesh is lower income (LI), while in Brazil there is a strong middle class with an 
upper middle income (UMI) rating, India is mostly lower middle income (LMI), while 
Israel is high income (HI), and South Africa is generally upper middle income (UMI). 
The point here is that no clear delineation can be made between the countries, at least in 
terms of their per capita income levels. In fact, within the data set, each country is 
representative of an entirely different per capita income level rating. 
The remaining 4 countries of the 9, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Indonesia, and Jamaica all received solid scores of 3, where the data was in alignment. 
This score of 3 reflects the presence of at least a moderate amount of human rights 
violations present within each liberal democracy. Specifically, the PTS data reveals that, 
for each of these countries, there is a documented record of extensive political 
imprisonment and unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views. The 
Dominican Republic is upper middle income (UMI), El Salvador lower middle income 
(LMI), Indonesia is also lower middle income (LMI), Indonesia is lower middle income 
(LMI), and Jamaica is considered upper middle income (UMI). Of note, there were no 
countries judged as high income or lower income, all of them fit within the realm of 
middle income per capita countries.   
 On the other hand, it has to be emphasized that there were still a total of 68 liberal 





2013 U.S. State Department data. These countries, according to the data employ human 
rights policies and practices that are in keeping with liberal democratic values. 36 are 
high income (HI) per capita, 20 of these countries are upper middle income (UMI), 11 are 
lower middle income (LMI), and only 1 country, Benin, is lower income (LI).  
 Of course, perhaps just as interesting that there were a total of 9 liberal 
democracies that at least moderate levels of human rights violations, there were 8 
countries around the world, which are not liberal democracies, whose record on human 
rights policy and practice was actually better than those 9 countries. Bosnia, Kosovo, Fiji, 
Guatemala, Laos, Qatar, Singapore, and the Solomon Islands all received PTS scores of 
at least a 2 or better in both the U.S. State Department data for 2013 and the Amnesty 
International data for 2012. All of these countries are lower middle income (LIM), except 
Qatar and Singapore, which are both high income (HI). 
 
Discussion 
 The key finding of this analysis of data is that, as of 2013, not all liberal 
democracies are observant of human rights policies and practices to the extent that liberal 
democratic theorists would expect. Of course, some liberal theorists might argue that this 
is a snapshot in time, and because liberal democracy is an ever-changing and adaptive 
form of governance, these countries might eventually self-correct their human rights 
policies and practices through the checks and balances inherit in the liberal democracy 
form of government. On the other hand, the empirical evidence is fairly difficult to 





worse violations of human rights policies and practices more clearly represent the realist 
view of liberal democracy. Meaning, these countries are employing policies and behavior 
that is suited for their particular situation in the given political landscape, both internally 
and externally, of the time. Recall that realists believe that states base their decisions, and 
indeed their policies, on calculations regarding the overall security of the state.  
 Consider, for example, the 5 liberal democracies with the worst record in terms of 
human rights policies and practices, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Israel, and South Africa. 
In each of these countries, an in-depth review of the data which was used to tabulate the 
PTS scores revealed that, there were significant issues with impunity in all cases except 
in Israel. In other words, these liberal democracies all had issues with official corruption 
that included a weak rule of law that allowed government officials to “commit human 
rights violations with impunity but also prevented citizens from claiming their rights.”46 
In the case of Israel, the government there was ineffective in protecting the rights of 
individual minorities, particularly those of Islamic faith, who were not viewed as having 
rights equal to that of the majority.47  
It is clear that in all of these cases, where the self-interests of the government or 
ruling majority were at stake in terms of human rights policies, violations occurred and 
the resulting overall PTS score was indicative of that behavior. In other words, if human 
rights had the strong correlating relationship with liberal democracy as liberal theorists 
believe, there should be no deviation.  Moreover, if the relationship between human 
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rights and liberal democracy was fundamental, then how could countries, which are 
widely regarded as being liberal democracies, have a record that is anything less than 
exemplary? The answer lies solidly within realist theory in that the human rights 
violations benefited the state and the ruling majority, at the time. In other words, the state 
chose to ignore or perhaps even violate at least some human rights to benefit in such a 
way that it helped secure the position of the majority.    
 Even more illustrative of the realist perspective in terms of the relationship 
between human rights and liberal democracy is that there were non-liberal democracies, 
whose record on human rights outshined that of some liberal democracies. The 
interesting point here is that a state does not necessarily have to be a liberal democracy to 
practice good human rights policy.  
 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented here has revealed that, in terms of the human rights 
policies of liberal democracies, states as of 2013 operated within the realm of realist 
theory. The data revealed that not all liberal democracies had the same approach to 
human rights and, in fact, several of them are clear offenders of human rights having 
received scores that indicated as much. Liberal theorists have argued on the 
codependency of human rights and liberal democratic governance but this research 
clearly reflected that the protection and practice of human rights is not exclusive to liberal 





would actualize human rights, we found no evidence that is case for all states.48  In fact, 
the score reflected that some liberal democracies actually infringe on individual liberties, 
including the exercise of political opposition. It was also discovered that, while a 
majority of liberal democracies do have rather stellar human rights records, there are 
indeed states that are not liberal democracies, which also have equally good human rights 
policies and practices.  
Recall that the core argument of the realist perspective is that security is 
paramount. In this research, it was clear that in some cases, a liberal democracy will 
undertake policies and practice that violate human rights. Consider, Israel which was one 
of the 9 liberal democracies with the worst human rights record. Without getting into the 
deep political and cultural sensitivities of the matter, Israel’s record is reflective of realist 
theory in that the state, with security probably foremost in its concerns, trumps the 
individual liberties of the minority. One would find that the same can be said for the other 
worst performing countries of Bangladesh, Brazil, India, and South Africa.  
The point here, is not to become bogged down in a nuanced debate over the merits 
or practices of each state and its particular circumstance but to view the data as 
collectively representative of a trend. This trend that the data revealed is clearly reflective 
of the realist view that state human rights policies and practices do not have a correlating 
relationship with liberal democracy. Sure, most liberal democracies are judged to have 
good human rights policies and practices but there are countries that have very poor 
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records that are still considered by widely regarded research conducted by Freedom 
House and the Polity Project to liberal democracies.  
Additionally, the data revealed that Europe, overall, had the best human rights 
policies and the greatest number of liberal democracies. While this research did not lend 
itself to investigating the causalities of that distinction, it was theorized that perhaps the 
establishment of the European Union, with its collective standards towards human rights, 
it at least partly responsible for the distinction as the continent with the most liberal 
democracies and the best human rights record. 
At this point, a fair question regarding the overall conclusions here might be why 
the realist school of thought is deemed correct in application to 9 liberal democracies that 
violated human rights but seemingly incorrect about the other 68 liberal democracies that 
respect human rights? In other words why is the realist behavior not more widespread? 
The answer, in realist form, is that the relationship between the state and its population is 
what is dictating the respect of human rights in those 68 liberal democracies. In other 
words, the realist recognizes that there might currently be a lot of states which respect 
human rights in practice but only because those policies are in line with the national 
preferences and beliefs of the domestic population, ensuring security and power. While 
an in-depth examination of this counterargument is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
can recall that realism presupposes that states behave in own their best interests of the 
given moment rather than idealizing. In other words, the greater question would be, if 
human rights policies are inherent to liberal democracy, how could there be states around 






Finally, this research sought to identify the countries that U.S. policy makers 
should focus finite political and economic capital on. A total of 9 liberal democracies 
were identified as having moderate to severely poor human rights records: Bangladesh, 
Brazil, India, Israel, South Africa, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Indonesia, and 
Jamaica. Understanding that their poor performance on human rights policies and 
practices is explained in realist theory, it does not necessarily mean that their poor record 











There is an ongoing debate in societies around the world today that surrounds 
government policies on internet freedom and internet restrictions. Most countries have 
some form of internet restriction, including countries that are considered full-fledged 
liberal democracies, such as the United States. Other countries have chosen to censor the 
internet based on the society’s values or on religious grounds, while other forms of 
government, usually totalitarian, have very high restrictions in place. Those tight 
restrictions are sometimes designed to limit the population’s access to outside 
information which might undermine ruling the regime. Most casual observers can readily 
identify countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea as having highly restrictive 
internet policies but these countries are not democracies, nor do they have a declared 
intent to become democracies or subscribe to liberal democratic principles.  
When looking at the national internet policies, it is important to remember that the 
policies have emerged over time, and were usually reactionary, based on the spread of 
access to the internet throughout the world. Sometimes the restrictions, even in liberal 
democracies, have been driven by private industry, usually service or infrastructure 
providers, seeking to recoup what otherwise might be lost revenue due to data freely 
traveling circuits from content publishers to users. For other liberal democracies, the 
restrictions on internet access might be based on religious, social, or moral grounds.   
Theorists have argued for several decades about the importance of the relationship 





cyber optimists, believe that internet policies that promote a freely accessible internet are 
essential to maintaining and encouraging a liberal democracy. In other words, liberal 
democracies should have internet policies that are reflective of the doctrines of a liberal 
democratic state. Realists or cyber pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the internet is 
simply another form of media and that internet policies do not have a substantial bearing 
on democracy at all. The implication is that it is not necessary for liberal democracies to 
have unrestricted internet policies because the internet by itself is not essential to 
maintaining democracy.  This paper seeks to determine whether the data available today 
gives credence to either theory as it applies to relationship between liberal democracy and 
internet policy.  
There are annual studies conducted by various groups that track and grade 
countries around the world in terms of the level of freedom users enjoy on the internet. 
There are also separate studies that annually assess each nation’s status to determine their 
form of governance. This paper seeks to determine whether there are correlations 
between the level of internet freedom of countries and their form of governance. In doing 
so, I hope to draw conclusions regarding the validity of theoretical arguments on the 
importance of internet policies to democratic governance. Specifically, are there liberal 
democracies with restrictive internet policies that are still largely considered to be 
successful liberal democracies? This paper takes the realist approach and hypothesizes 
that state internet policies are not reflective of the state’s overall commitment to 
democratic governance. In other words, the more liberal democratic the state, does not 





The paper first reviews existing literature to assess the ongoing scholarly debate 
regarding whether internet policies correlate to democratic governance. Next, the 
methodology used for the case study is described along with some considerations. Then, 
the case study, which identifies liberal democratic states and their overall internet policy, 
and uncovers commonalities and deviations between the liberal democracy and internet 
policy. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding whether the evidence supports or rejects 
the hypothesis that states, which are judged to be liberal democracies, have corresponding 
liberal internet policies.  
 
Literature Review 
 First, it is important to define a liberal democracy and to categorize the countries 
around the world are considered liberal democracies and why. The theory of liberal 
democracy applied here is best defined using the ideas articulated by John Rawls, who 
was one of the foremost liberalist philosophy writers of our time, and whose ideas are 
rooted in the earlier liberal philosophical writings of Huntington, Locke, Rousseau, and 
Kant. Rawls explained that a politically liberal democracy is full of a “pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” and the acceptance of 
“incompatible, yet reasonable (opposing) comprehensive doctrines.”49 In other words, 
liberal democracies exist within a competition of ideas where opposing points of view are 
accepted and debated freely. Rawls later revised his theory to specify that the basic 
requirement of a liberal democracy is that “the reasonable doctrine” accepts a 
“constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.”50  
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Rawls noted that democratic societies will differ in their specific doctrines, which 
will change over time, but the constant is the relationship between the basic moral and 
political values (reasonable doctrine) of the government to its citizens and vice versa.51 
Succinctly, in a liberal democracy, the government and its policies are obligated to the 
public’s values and beliefs and the government operates within the confines of the 
established rule of law. The public’s values exist as the underpinning of the liberal 
democratic state. This paper specifically recognizes a liberal democracy as a state that is 
democratically ruled by a government that is accountable to the general population and 
where the individual political liberties are recognized and protected through established 
constitutional law.   
 Within the overall theory of liberal democracy, Rawls categorized policies on 
media in a category called “the background culture.”52 This area is the realm of the liberal 
democracy in which the “liberties of thought, speech, and the right of free association” 
exist within the framework of the liberal democracy’s rule of law.53 Rawls specifically 
articulated that political liberalism asserts “the need for full and open discussion in the 
background culture” within a liberal democracy.54  
 
Internet Policy and Democracy 
 Turning to internet policy within a liberal democracy, it is important to note that, 
as the internet began to emerge in 1989 -- then commonly referred to as “the world wide 
web” -- there were scarce government policies in place in any country, liberal democracy 
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or otherwise, to regulate or liberate it.55 Of course there were scientific experiments and 
university projects that studied the internet concept dating back to the early 1980s and 
military projects that began much earlier but we are specifically interested here in the 
period from the 1990s through the present when internet access emerged for use by the 
general population of liberal democracies.   
With the proliferation of the internet, a flurry of scholarly debate erupted 
particularly in the field of political science regarding the relationship between the internet 
and democracy. Throughout the body of published literature there emerged roughly two 
schools of thought, which are commonly referred to as the cyber-optimist perspective and 
the cyber-pessimist perspective.56 The literature was focused on what policies, if any, 
would be necessary to maintaining and encouraging liberal democracy and assessing the 
relationship between internet policy and democracy.  
 
Cyber Optimism 
 One of the earliest proponents of the cyber-optimist perspective was Professor 
Howard Rheingold of Stanford University, who in 1993 published a book which was and 
still is, available for free on the internet titled, The Virtual Community. Rheingold’s work, 
which was culled together using his own experience and over 200 individual sources of 
published works, argued of the internet’s potential importance to “political liberties and 
the ways virtual communities are likely to change our experience of the real world, as 
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individuals and communities.” 57 Rheingold and subsequent cyber-optimists, predicted 
that the internet would “contest the existing hierarchy’s monopoly” of the domination of 
control of mass media, and invigorate democracy worldwide. 58  The cyber optimist 
perspective really dominated much of the early writing of the relationship between liberal 
democracies and internet policy. They predicted that the freer internet policies would 
give power to potential voters and the citizenry of a country because information about 
the candidates, their positions, and their proposals would be easily and readily 
accessible.59 Moreover, cyber optimists believe that unrestrictive internet policies would 
be essential to complement liberal democracy because the quality of the information 
available on the internet would enhance and prove to be better than traditional media 
because the citizenry would have nearly direct and independent access to the information, 
at relatively low cost, without financial bias. In other words, the citizenry would not have 
to travel to major cities or become major funding donors to have access to government 
officials, politicians, or candidates themselves, without the filter of profit-driven or state-
run conventional media outlets such as television, newspapers, and radio. In fact, many 
cyber optimists predicted that liberal democracy would flourish around the world, 
powered by the internet. There were others in the cyber optimist movement that went 
further in their predictions. They argued that the internet would be the “cure” for 
“suffering” emerging democracies around the world because the internet would overcome 
the shortcomings of traditional media in terms of accessibility and freedom from bias. 
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Furthermore, cyber optimists, while noting that the internet was developing unevenly 
throughout the world, predicted that a free and unrestricted internet would eventually 
become “democracy’s future.”60  
The common theme among cyber optimist arguments is the general belief that in a 
liberal democracy, the internet should be a medium that is completely and totally 
accessible to all. Within the cyber optimist movement, there initially seemed to be little 
consideration or perhaps acceptance that the internet might be a medium that could be 
controlled, censored, or even blocked completely by public and private entities, 
especially in a liberal democracy. The cyber optimists, instead, predicted that the internet 
would be a mobilization tool for fringe movements to gain traction and notoriety, where 
they had often been overlooked and discounted or censored. German sociologist and 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere is often cited by cyber 
optimists to support the idea that the internet, as a manifestation of the public sphere, will 
remain completely free and unrestricted because it would be totally driven by internet 
users themselves. 61  Most cyber optimists find it inconceivable that the internet would 
succumb to being censored or regulated by private interests or the state, particularly in 
liberal democracies.  
French philosopher Pierre Levy went as far as predicting a global 
“cyberdemocracy” where the internet “optimizes the possibilities of exchange between 
resources available and projects requiring them, leaves the decision-making process more 
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transparent, and allows for a democracy in which everyone can participate.62 Levy, rather 
poetically, argued that “the fact that everything is possible on the Internet reveals 
mankind's true essence, the aspiration towards freedom,” and harkening to the notion of 
how important unrestricted internet policies are to liberal democracy. 63 
 
Cyber Pessimism  
Cyber pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the relationship between the 
internet and liberal democracies would be insignificant. As early as the 1990s, they 
predicted that governments would use the same controls and interests that influenced 
traditional media, such as radio and television. Some pessimists, rooted in realist theory, 
even argued that the internet would be likely to fortify the state’s existing societal 
divisions, including social relationship and class, both domestically and internationally.64  
Furthermore, they argue that the idea that the internet would solidify liberal 
democracy and its spread around the world simply because it was a new and emerging 
information medium, was preposterous. For most cyber pessimists, the strongest 
disagreement they have with the cyber optimists is that the idea that the internet would be 
a breakthrough form of media that would change everything. They point to the historical 
predications that surrounded the introduction of the telephone, radio, and television as 
evidence that these types of “utopian” predications were false in terms of media policy 
importance to liberal democracy.65 Cyber pessimists point out that optimistic and 
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dreadful assertions about emerging media bear a persistent pattern, as they reappear 
throughout history.66 Cyber pessimist arguments emphasize the historical evidence which 
has shown that neither radio nor television fundamentally changed the political process or 
ushered in more liberal forms of democracy around the world. In established liberal 
democracies, in particular, cyber pessimists predicted that the internet would not bring 
any new voices to the public discourse. 67  In other words, they believed that those who 
were already in possession of power and influence would simply use the internet as 
another medium to disseminate their views.  Another typical cyber pessimist view is that 
the internet would continue to “reinforce the existing participation gap between the 
engaged and the apathetic.”68   
Cyber pessimists also did not believe that the internet, by itself, would be 
responsible for bringing fostering the development of liberal democratic governance 
around the globe. Instead, most argue that the internet is a supplementary, but not 
upsetting, conduit in the existing political construct.   
Cyber pessimists predicted that the internet would present greater opportunities 
for states to infringe on the principles of liberal democracy.69 They claimed that the 
internet policy would perhaps be the greatest threat to democracy because internet users 
will be the victims of constant surveillance by both governmental and private entities, 
even in liberal democracies. There is also a rather existentialist element to this part of the 
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cyber pessimism position because there is often the rather dire warning that liberal 
democracies would eventually infringe on civil liberties and indeed sacrificed them 
because “the more we use the Net, the more it will tend to draw us into the unreal, the 
more it will tend to draw us into the unreal, virtual worlds populated by those who want 
to flee all the ills that flesh is heir to.”70  In other words, a free and unrestricted internet 
would become a hotbed of crime and immoral activity because of the detachment of 
reality and consequences, thus forcing liberal democracies to police it more heavily. 
Whereas the cyber optimists predicted a more robust participation in political discourse 
and the flourishing of liberal democracy because of the internet, the pessimists predicted 
the spread of public lethargy and disinterest in the democratic process because of the 
detachment from the real world.71 
 
  
Liberal Democracy and Internet Policy  
Next, we need to establish how internet policies might be related to democracy, as 
argued by the cyber optimists. Because liberal democracy is an ever evolving political 
system that is reliant on the flow, debate, and adoption of social standards and ideas -- or 
as Rawls put it, the reasonable doctrine -- the internet offers a collective medium for this 
discourse. The cyber optimist point of view specifically holds that, a change in 
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communications medium can have profound implications for the nature and character of 
the political process and debate.72  
It is also important to note that, contingent on internet penetration and availability, 
internet users are increasingly interacting and even reliant on the internet as their only 
means of communication with the government. For example, recent studies have shown 
that users are interacting with the government in various ways including submitting 
feedback to politicians, organizing grassroots campaigns to gain support for ideas, and 
even to apply for permits or pay fees or fines.  It is worth mentioning that the 2013 
rollout of the Affordable Care Act in the United States, relied heavily on the internet to 
provide the mechanism for which people could apply for health insurance coverage from 
the government. But, internet interaction between the citizenry and the liberal democratic 
government is not just occurring in the United States, it is a global phenomenon. Citizens 
in Germany pay view their taxes and policies online73, British citizens can transact just 
about every sort of government service available74, and even in Mexico, citizens can 
register a business and apply for government employment via the internet.75  Indeed 
federal governments are not the only ones interacting with the citizenry, provincial or 
state governments, along with local and municipal governments are also increasingly 
reliant on the internet. The argument here is not that because a government offers 
services on the internet, those transactions equate to a successful democracy. Surely 
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Chinese citizens can interact with the government of China online to submit passport 
requests and schedule appointments. The point is that, in a liberal democracy, 
communication with the government is a necessary and vital ingredient and the internet is 
critical to facilitating that interaction. In other words, we would not consider a country to 
be a liberal democracy if its citizenry was prevented from communicating with the 
government or each other. In addition to the practical and lawful capability to voice and 
engage in discussion and debate, citizens must be allowed to conduct themselves without 
fear of retribution from government or even private institutions.  
Within liberal democracies today, the cyber-optimist perspective is manifested by 
those who argue for the importance of “net neutrality.” Net neutrality policies advocate 
for a free and open internet where the government and state-owned or private internet 
service providers may not discriminate between different types of content and 
applications online. Whether to uphold net neutrality is a hugely important debate that is 
ongoing in liberal democracies across the globe. The policy choices liberal democracies 
will eventually choose in terms of net neutrality might have a cascading impact on new 
and emerging democracies.  
Tim Wu, a professor at Columbia Law School, first introduced the concept of net 
neutrality and its associated policies in 2003. Wu argued that internet service providers, 
no matter if they are state or privately owned, should not be permitted to discriminate 
internet content. He specifically highlighted the importance of equal competition of and 
access to data, which is a very liberal democratic principle. Wu summarized the ongoing 





service providers and that of the public’s interest in a competitive environment.76 
Essentially what is at stake here is whether, in a liberal democratic society, the 
government should allow private entities to emplace restrictions on the internet which are 
outside or in addition to the reasonable doctrine of laws already accepted and enacted by 
the liberal democratic state. 
Opponents of net neutrality argue that continued neutrality policies will result in 
reduced internet service and quality for users. They point out that service providers, 
particularly private entities, are not able to appropriately seek compensation for the data 
that travels across their lines. 77 In other words, Facebook, for example, does not pay 
AT&T or Deutsche Telekom for the use of their network pipes, which Facebook data is 
traversing. True, Facebook does pay a fee for its access to the internet, but that is to the 
access provider, which is usually at the local level. Facebook is not paying for the bits 
that are traveling across various international lines to a user, say in Australia. If providers 
are not able to control or restrict the data that is traveling over their lines, what is the 
incentive for them to build new lines or upgrade existing ones?   
Furthermore, liberal democratic policies usually advocate for some sort of free-
market economy in which the rights of private entities are vigorously defended. As such, 
cyber pessimists would argue that service providers should be able to restrict the use of 
their infrastructure as they see fit. With this in mind, one can see that this financial 
aspect, which some might refer to as an unfair burden, raises greater concerns over 
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income generation and fair pricing.78 In the U.S., the standard bearer of liberal 
democracy, service providers are currently arguing in courts and lobbying governments 
because they feel that internet users are the only ones who benefit from net neutrality, 
while they – the service providers - see net neutrality as a detriment to their own use of 
their own property.79  
The cyber optimists, on the other hand, argue that in the absence of net neutrality 
policies, the principles of liberal democracy are threatened because private entities would 
be able to filter content to users.80 In other words, the private entity service providers 
would be able to filter out content from entities that have not paid or not paid enough to 
have their content featured or permitted. In this way, cyber optimists believe that liberal 
democracy is threatened because the citizenry, meaning the internet users themselves, 
could be restricted from the free exchange of ideas because private entities could 
eliminate or filter out the existence of any content it sees fit. For example, consider that it 
might be possible for a politician or candidate with a large sum of money to basically buy 
off a service providers to block the content of an opposition group or opponent. The 
backers of net neutrality warn that this type of activity threatens the global internet 
marketplace because new competitors can essentially be blocked from the market at 
inception. It is reasonable to believe that creativity and innovation might suffer as well.  
The net neutrality debate is really central to the connection between the internet 
and the liberal democracy. While private entities, or service providers, might view net 
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neutrality as a regulation, it is necessary to remember that regulation at some levels is 
vital to maintaining a healthy competition in the marketplace. Liberal democracies 
recognize the importance of regulation so long as the regulation is within the bounds of 
the democratic doctrine of the constitutional and legitimate law. In other words, liberal 
democracies can have regulations on the internet that would make it a criminal offense to 
use the internet to threaten or plan to kill someone, to propagate child pornography, or to 
commit malicious libel but those regulations do not deny to users, the access or 
availability or even existence of, that kind of data.  
Limits to the appropriate or acceptable level of regulation within a liberal 
democracy relationship are hotly contested partly because of the implications net 
neutrality policies have on the practice of liberal democracy itself. The consequences of 
the absence of net neutrality laws on liberal democracy become even more apparent if 
one is to consider how much the internet has become an important method of interaction 
between the citizenry and its government, this essential ingredient in liberal democracy. 
Is it not reasonable to assume that, without net neutrality, private entity service providers 
might be able to unfairly impact the government’s presence on the internet? Liberal 
democracies today are familiar with openly politically biased television, radio, and print 
media where politics is presented in such a way that clearly one party or one position is 
favored over another. Would internet users then have to find a service provider that 







Finally, while we have looked at the overarching debate on internet policy, 
namely net neutrality, it is important to remember that all governments around the world 
are not created equal. This paper is specifically interested in liberal democracy policies 
towards the internet, but it is worth mentioning that there are authoritarian and autocratic 
governments around the world with strict regulations on the internet. In this regard, the 
cyber pessimist argument appears, thus far, to be already correct, but only in application 
to non-democratic governments, which have clearly found ways to control and restrict 
access to data on the internet in much the same way that they have controlled more 
traditional media. These controls and restrictions can be broken down into a couple of 
categories. Usually, the autocratic or authoritative government controls access to the 
internet through registration requirements, through filtering, or through blatant 
intimidation through laws.81 Similar to what was covered in terms of the consequences of 
the absence of net neutrality, authoritarian and totalitarian type governments typically 
control all aspects of their internet. The result of this has been a severe limiting of 
political discourse and, because of the filtering mechanisms, a very slow internet access 
capability.82 83 84 85 
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Hypothesis and Theory 
The hypothesis is that the evidence will show that liberal democracies practice the 
cyber pessimist or realist perspective in terms of their approach to internet freedom. 
While most liberal democracies will offer protections regarding the competition of 
opposing points of view within the confines of the constitutionally established rule of 
law, their internet policies will reflect the paramount importance of state security and 
state interests. Internet policies will not be indicative of the commitment to the 
continuance and practice of liberal democracy. Instead internet accessibility policies in 
liberal democracies will reflect varying levels of restriction. 
 
Methodology  
The aim of this paper is to look at liberal democracies around the world today and 
compare their level of internet freedom with their polity score. The interest is 
investigating whether all liberal democracies around the world allow largely unrestricted 
access to content on the internet, as argued by the cyber optimist would be the necessary 
relationship between a liberal democracy and its internet policy.  Whether the data 
presented any variation or none at all, it was expected to lend an interesting conclusion 
about the levels of internet regulation in liberal democracies. 
This paper draws from three accessible data sources. First, to identify liberal 
democracies around the world, the 2014 version of Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World dataset was used. The Freedom House dataset is one of the most widely used as a 
data source for empirical academic research because the methodology and data is freely 





House does not have its critics, who question whether western political science experts 
might be inherently biased. 86 Nevertheless, Freedom House makes the data available, 
subjected to independent study and critique, and is still one of the most complete sources 
available for measuring a state’s governance. One important distinction to make with 
regards to Freedom House research is the distinction between electoral democracy and 
liberal democracy. The Freedom House methodology explains that “Freedom House’s 
term “electoral democracy” differs from “liberal democracy” in that the latter also 
implies the presence of a substantial array of civil liberties.”87 Freedom House grades 
each country to categorize them as Free, Partly Free, or not Free. In their published 
findings, Freedom House further explains that ‘Free’ counties are considered liberal 
democracies and they are all electoral democracies. Some ‘Partly Free’ countries might 
be electoral democracies, but they are not liberal democracies.88 In 2014, Freedom House 
graded 88 of the 195 countries evaluated around the world as Free, meaning liberal 
democracies, see Table 1 below.  
Table 1. 
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Some consideration was given toward data available from the Polity IV project, 
an independent organization founded by Political Science Professor Ted Gurr, formerly 
of George Mason University and the University of Maryland. The Polity project ranks 
countries on a scale that ranges from “strongly autocratic” to “strongly democratic”. 
While the Polity project ranking data was comprehensive and did not differ significantly 
from the data from Freedom House, there was no clear way to delineate liberal 
democracies from within the data from those which might be called democratic or 
strongly democratic. The Freedom House Freedom in the World dataset was thus chosen 
for analysis here. 
Next, we had to consider that internet policy might not be relevant at all in a 
liberal democracy if the citizenry of the liberal democracy did not have access to the 
internet. Because some countries in the world are poor, remote or have no internet 
infrastructure, there simply might not be enough access to the internet, at an individual 
level, for internet policy to matter in the first place. To correct for this variable, data was 
used from a 2014 study conducted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
to understand the level of internet penetration with regards to the 88 identified liberal 
democracies. The ITU is the United Nations specialized agency for information and 
communication technologies and it collects data from official sources, including 
telecommunications providers and state regulators. The 2014 report noted that “access to 
the internet is the ultimate way of guaranteeing an inclusive information society” and 
boasted that global data now shows internet penetration is at 40.4%, meaning that over 3 
billion people now have access to the internet. 89 The 2014 report also found serious 
                                                          





internet accessibility divides in many countries, particularly in developing countries.90 
The ITU specified that over 4.3 billion people do not have internet access and 90% of 
them people live in the developing world.  
The ITU data was specific enough in that it provided a percentage for internet 
users who have access to the internet from their homes. This study relied on that metric 
because of the specific interest in the internet accessibility liberties of the citizen at home 
and not in terms of a citizen’s access to the internet while acting in an official capacity, 
performing the official duties of a job or even at school during the course of study. 
Understanding how the internet restrictions of a country affect the citizen personally, at 
home, is key because we are interested in the liberty and thus the level of restriction 
placed on the citizen as an individual user of the internet. 
There are several factors that are in play in terms of limiting internet penetration 
in a country which are outside the realm of policy. In other words, it might not 
necessarily matter what the state’s policy is regarding restrictions or freedom on the 
internet if there is no internet or related technology available. The ITU specifically lists 
42 countries around the world, most of which are in Africa, that have been defined as the 
“least connected countries,” with internet penetration rates of less than 1%. 91 Of the list 
of 42 countries, three factors emerged that contributed directly to the lack of internet 
penetration and thus usage: low education and literacy, limited or lack of electricity, and 
poor or underdeveloped communications infrastructure. 92 In terms of the scope of this 
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paper, the following least connected countries, which are also liberal democracies, have 
been excluded from consideration because of the clear lack of internet penetration, 
measuring less than 2%: Benin, Lesotho, Sao Tome, Senegal, Samoa, and Vanatu. 
Additionally, no data was available for 22 liberal democracies, also resulting in their 
exclusion from consideration, see Table 3 below. 
Table 3  
Bahamas Kiribati Nauru Taiwan 
Belize Lesotho Palau Tonga 
Botswana Liechtenstein St Vincent Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominica Marshall Islands Samoa Tuvalu 
Grenada Micronesia San Marino   
Guyana Monaco Sao Tome   
 
 Finally, the most difficult data to obtain was also the most limiting in terms of the 
research. In order to understand the level of freedom individual internet users have in a 
particular country, several reputable data sources were available however none were 
complete nor do they include data from each of the identified liberal democracy under 
examination.  
Freedom House published a study in 2013 called Freedom on the Net, which 
looked at the internet policies of 60 different countries and the ability of individual users 
to freely access the internet. 93 Of the 60 countries for which data was available, only 15 
of those countries were also classified as liberal democracies. Freedom House uses Free, 
Partly Free, and Not Free to categorize a nation’s internet policies. Each of the countries 
included in the Freedom on the Net study were given a numerical value in terms of each 
government’s internet policies, which fall into three categories: obstacles to access, limits 
                                                          






on content, and violations of user rights.94  Freedom House defines obstacles to access as 
the state’s infrastructural and economic barriers to access, the limits on content to refer to 
governmental efforts to block specific applications or technologies, and the violation of 
user rights as government’s legal and ownership control over internet access providers.95 
The categories are then subdivided into further categories with hundreds of criteria and 
are graded accordingly. 
 Freedom House numerical values range from 0 to 100, with countries judged with 
values between 0 to 30 assessed to have “Free” or minimally restrictive internet 
accessibility policies, those with scores between 31 to 60 are labeled “Partly Free,” and 
those with scores from 61 to 100 judged to have internet polices that are “Not Free,” or 
highly restrictive.96  
 Separate data, available from Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet 
and Society, provided data on the level of freedom individual internet users in 11 of the 
countries identified as liberal democracies however, some of the information was based 
on data for some countries that was nearly 5 years old.97 The Harvard data and the 
Freedom House data were analyzed for deviation in terms of terms of the assessment 
given for each state’s internet policy. Since, both datasets were in agreement, the 
Freedom House data was selected for inclusion here, specifically because the dataset was 
more recent. The correlated available data resulted in 15 liberal democracies with 
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sufficient data available to serve as the representative sample to compare governance 
with internet policy, see Table 2 below. 
Table 2. 
Argentina Estonia Hungary Italy South Korea 
Australia France Iceland Japan United Kingdom 




 Within the representative sample of data under consideration, almost all of the 
liberal democracies have corresponding free internet policies, in concurrence with the 
cyber optimist theory on liberal democracies having to maintain largely unrestrictive 
internet policies. On the other hand, the data revealed that 3 of the 15 identified liberal 
democracies do have internet policies that are judged to be restrictive, lending weight to 
the cyber pessimist belief or realist theory that liberal democracies would eventually have 
to restrict the internet in the way they have with other forms of media. A table of this 
analysis is attached, labeled Appendix 1. The specific countries of interest in terms of 
being liberal democracies with restrictive internet policies are Brazil, India, and South 
Korea. Again, it is worth noting that these countries are solidly considered to be liberal 
democracies and yet they have highly restrictive internet policies. That is to say that these 
liberal democracies were judged to have less than free internet policies, by a team of 
experts, meaning they each are restricting internet access through content filtering or take 
legal action against political opposition groups or minorities.  
Before investigating the 3 countries judged to have less than free internet policies, 





liberal democracies with free internet policies. First, all of the liberal democracies judged 
to have open and largely non-restrictive internet policies have over 30% domestic internet 
penetration rates as derived from the ITU data. Next, the remainder of the representative 
liberal democracies were concentrated in Europe. The reason most liberal democracies 
with free and open internet appeared to be concentrated in Europe was likely a result of 
the data actually being available, although other factors were possibly at play and those 
will be explored later in the conclusions.  
In terms of the upper and lower fence of the representative data, Iceland had the 
highest internet penetration rate measuring a whopping 96.4% while South Africa was 
the liberal democracy with the lowest internet penetration rate, measuring just 33.9% 
domestic internet penetration. Geographically speaking, South Africa’s lack of internet 
penetration appeared to fit the ITU’s general assessment of Africa, which specified 
poverty, a lack of comprehensive domestic internet infrastructure, and electricity issues to 
explain the low penetration rates on the continent. In Europe, Denmark was clearly the 
liberal democracy with the highest internet penetration rate, registering 92.7% of 
households with largely unrestricted access to the internet. In the Americas, with the 
United States and Argentina as the representative liberal democracies, a modest 71.7% 
and 47.5% internet penetration rate were observed respectively in combination with 
largely unrestrictive internet policies. In the Asia-Pacific region, Japan represented liberal 
democracies with 86.2% internet penetration and free access of data on the internet.  
Turning to the three liberal democracies, who in realist or cyber pessimist theory 
actually restrict internet access, the three countries appeared to have little in common 





policies than the rest of the representative data. Brazil received a less than free score 
because the government there reportedly engaged in legal intimidation of political 
opposition groups who posted to online forums. It also brought about legal charges 
against minority rights seekers and political oppositionists who spoke out against the 
government online. In both India and South Korea, the governments there employ 
technical filtering and blocking so that messages, particularly emanating from a 
neighboring country do not undermine the regime. India’s concern is with Pakistan and 
South Korea’s concern is with North Korea. In both cases, the government limits the 
population’s access to websites hosted in the neighboring country and filters out political 
content that is deemed threatening. 
In terms of the penetration rate for the countries judged to have restrictive internet 
policies, there was little commonality. Brazil had approximately a 39.6% household 
internet penetration rate, followed by India, with a dismal 3.1% rate, and South Korea 
with an incredible 98.1%. It has to be noted that South Korea, despite its rating of Partly 
Free, had the highest household internet accessibility penetration rate of any country in 
the representative data set. 
  
Discussion 
 The data used in this research revealed that not all liberal democracies have free 
or largely unrestrictive internet policies. While currently, most liberal democracies do 
have unrestrictive internet policies, the fact that some do not reinforces the cyber 
pessimist or realist perspective regarding the link between democracy and guaranteed 





the interests that influenced restrictions on traditional media which, as realists argue, 
fortify the state’s existing societal divisions, including social relationship and class, both 
domestically and internationally. The question remains though, why do most liberal 
democracies have free internet policies? The answer, in cyber optimist form, would 
probably be that largely unrestrictive internet policies are in keeping with the foundations 
of liberal democracy and liberal democracies recognize the importance of encouraging 
and maintaining the free flowing competition of ideas and data. But the realist would 
easily counter that the largely unrestrictive internet policies of most liberal democracies is 
a result of a determination by each state, that its current security interests are best served 
by those policies. 
Additionally, one could argue that, within the representative data, the prevalence 
of European countries might be causing an unfair skew of the numbers for liberal 
democracies with largely unrestrictive internet policies because most of the countries fall 
within the European Union. For the time being, this argument would be unfounded 
because the European Union has yet to enact legislation that would formalize net 
neutrality although measures are being debated and hotly contested. 98 In other words, 
today, there is no comprehensive law that applies to all European Union member states 
and each has its own policy governing restrictions on the internet. The argument could 
also be made that European states have often adopted much more liberal democratic 
policies than other states in the world (see the Netherlands laws regarding prostitution) 
but perhaps this is more indicative of the commitment European nations have towards 
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liberal democratic principles. With that in mind, perhaps the largely unrestrictive internet 
policies of European nations might be representative of the overall health of liberal 
democracy in Europe. 
Moreover, if liberal democracies need to have corresponding unrestrictive internet 
policies, why then, have Brazil, India, and South Korea chosen to pursue internet policies 
that have been judged to invasive and restrictive? An in-depth review of the policies 
revealed that, in the case of Brazil, while the government is not currently using technical 
means to limit access to data, it has enacted very strict policies regarding the publication 
of political content.99 The policies, as cyber pessimists predicted, closely mirror the laws 
and policies Brazil already had in place for traditional media. Specifically, Brazil 
monitors and takes legal action against anyone who produces online content that would 
“offend the dignity or decorum” of a political candidate and there are other puzzlingly 
restrictive laws regarding media coverage of politicians and the election process.100  
There are also several very troubling scenarios where bloggers and web-based reporters 
have disappeared or turned up dead following reports where they uncovered government 
corruption.101 The combination of the multitude of these infraction, specifically targeting 
the political process by a supposed liberal democracy accounted for the low marks Brazil 
received in terms of its lower score on internet policy.   
The internet policies of India and South Korea are actually quite similar in that 
both countries employ active technical filtering and blocking of internet content and that 
is why, despite their grade as a liberal democracy, they were judged not to have free or 
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unrestrictive internet policies. 102 Both India and South Korea are filtering and blocking 
internet content that they claim are security threats, usually emanating from the 
neighboring state; in India’s case the content usually filtered coming from Pakistan and in 
South Korea’s case, the content being filtered coming from North Korea.103 What is 
particularly alarming here is that in both cases, the government has emplaced active 
filters and blocks to internet content, which conflicts with the application of liberal 
democratic practice. While recent signs in South Korea are promising in that the judicial 
branch of government is beginning to offer checks and balances and indeed a return to 
the liberal democratic values of the state’s constitution, India does not appear to be 
relenting in any way. 104  While only time will tell whether South Korea continues to 
make strides loosening its restrictions on internet content and whether India continues its 
restrictions, the international community might want to keep a close eye on both 
countries, and Brazil, to look for other indications of a possible turn away from liberal 
democratic policies.  
 
Conclusion 
This research has identified 3 countries which are representative of the cyber 
pessimist, or realist theory, that it is not necessary for liberal democracies to have 
unrestrictive internet policies because the internet by itself is not essential to maintaining 
democracy. While there is evidence, with 12 of the 15 representative liberal democracies 
all having unrestrictive internet policies, to show that most liberal democracies currently 
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recognize the importance of internet policy in terms of maintaining liberal democracy, 
only time and state security interests will tell if that continues to be the case. Perhaps 
restrictive internet policy might indeed be an early indicator of a turn away from liberal 
democracy in favor of heavier policing or the growing influence of special interests. 
Based on this research, an interesting question emerges and is worth monitoring over 
time to see how the relationship between the citizenry and the state influences the internet 
policies of the future, particularly whether pressure from the citizenry impacts the 







Chapter 3: The relationship between religious policy and liberal democracy? An Analysis 




A rash of debate in recent years regarding the Arab Spring and its implications for 
a potential wave of democracy taking hold in the Middle East has raised the question of 
what role religion will play in the emerging new states of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and of 
this writing, perhaps Syria. The debate centers on what structure the new and fledgling 
governments will chose and whether that structure will be prone in any way to instability 
and impede the transition to democracy. The role of religion during this process is 
certainly not to be overlooked. In fact, the role of religion in a democracy is a question 
that has been debated as long as the concept of democracy itself. Can a state truly claim 
to be democratic, particularly a liberal democracy, if the government does not protect the 
liberty of all religions, shows preference in its policies and legislation towards a 
particular religion, or fails to establish neutrality towards religion itself? Many scholars, 
including Robert Audi have argued that in order for a government to even be considered 
liberal democracy, there must be a clear separation of church and state, not only in 
government policy, but also in the practice of governing.105  
Today, it remains unclear what structural forms of government Tunisia, Libya, or 
Egypt will finally adopt or what role religion will play in their governance. In fact, 
whatever the implications are of the Arab Spring, it is worthwhile for policy theorists and 
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political science academics to revisit the process of state transition to liberal democracy 
and to reassess the best practices for government policy in terms of religious 
consideration. The West, especially the United States, has its own theory of what a 
successful transition to liberal democracy should look like and it usually begins with an 
emphasis on the need for a clear and established separation between church and state. It 
should be noted, however, that many argue that the United States is a nation that was 
founded on the basis Christian values and whose policies and laws are often influenced 
on religious grounds. That argument notwithstanding, the point here is to explore the 
relationship between church and state, particularly, how the state deals with religion 
during the transition to liberal democracy. This information would not just be of scholarly 
value, but would also help policymakers with understanding some of the pitfalls that exist 
when formulating religious policy during a transition to democracy.  
In terms of the democratic transition, many scholars and theorists have attempted 
to explore the factors influencing democratic success and failure in an effort to offer 
insight into the phenomena that will best foster successful democratic transition. Some 
have focused on the importance of the rule of law106, others have looked at the role of 
ethnicity107, and others, the role of education and economic growth.108 This paper, 
however, looks at importance of state religious policy and its role in contributing to the 
transition to liberal democracy. Specifically, the paper examines the ongoing transition to 
liberal democracy of the former Soviet state of Kyrgyzstan in comparison to the 
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authoritarian Uzbekistan to examine the role of religion-related policy during this 
process. The paper examines the two states, with similar history and policy choices, in an 
attempt to gauge the impact of religious policy during the transition to independence 
following the fall of the Soviet Union. The study finds evidence to support Alfred 
Stepan's theory regarding the importance of 'twin toleration' between church and state in 
terms of religious policy. It also uncovers that state suppression of religion can lead to 
instability and even a recoil from the transition to liberal democracy in some cases. The 
paper also discovers that, in keeping with realist theory, the state formulates its religious 
policies based on what is determined to be in the best interests of state security, at the 
time.   
The paper is structured into three basic sections. The first section is a theoretical 
review of the definition of democracy, what is meant by transition to democracy, the 
religious policy choices available to states transitioning to liberal democracy, and 
international relations theory about the relationship between religion and liberal 
democracy. The second section introduces the case study by explaining rationale behind 
the selection of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, offers historical context by describing the 
Soviet policies toward religion that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had to navigate from, and 
describes the formation of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Finally, the third section offers a 
comparison of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in terms of their religious policy choices and 









To paraphrase Lipset and Lakin, there are just about as many definitions of 
democracy as there are scholars studying it.109 Since the original concept of democracy 
dates back as far as ancient Greek philosophy, this paper borrows from author Robert 
Audi, and famously articulated by Abraham Lincoln, to begin by offering a 
comparatively more modern and rather simplistic definition: a liberal democracy is 
government of, by, and for the people.110 In other words, leadership in a liberal 
democracy is determined through competitive election by the governed population. This 
means that the central theme of liberal democracy is the existence of a free electoral 
dimension and accountable representation. While this simplistic definition is indeed open 
to criticism, this paper remedies this problem by borrowing from one of the most widely 
used assessments of liberal democracy, the annual global survey conducted by the U.S.-
based independent watchdog organization, Freedom House. The survey looks at civil 
liberties, political rights, and election processes and grades each nation using a scale of 
'free,' 'partly free,' and 'not free' to grade countries on democracy.111 Freedom House 
evaluates political rights and civil liberties of countries and breaks out the assessment 
into categories. For instance, Freedom House further defines political rights in terms of 
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the overall functioning of 
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government. 112 It also views civil liberties in categories that include the freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights (assembly, demonstration, 
public discussion), the rule of law (independent judiciary and fair process), and personal 
autonomy and individual rights.113 Freedom House's work provides the most 
comprehensive baseline of annual quantitative and qualitative data from which we can 
best assess where a particular country is during the transition to liberal democracy. It is 
necessary to emphasize here that this paper looks at the transition to liberal democracy 
and offers no assessment as to whether a certain nation has achieved democracy outside 
of the Freedom House appraisal because to do so would call for more analysis than is 
within the scope of this paper. The states selected for this paper are treated as 
transitioning to liberal democracy based on their stated intent and the process is assumed 
to be continuous. 
  
Consideration of Factors Influencing Democracy 
 There is a great deal of conversation in democratic theory about what factors 
ultimately influence or limit the transition to liberal democracy. There are two clear 
schools of thought regarding this topic. One set of scholars believe that there are a set of 
factors that influence democratic transitions while another set of  scholars argue that 
factors are not as important so long as the transition is led by charismatic leadership that 
is determined to make the transition to democracy.  The most notable theorist for those 
who argue that a whole set of factors collectively contribute to the successful transition to 
democracy is Samuel P. Huntington. In his highly influential book, The Third Wave: 
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Democratization in the Late 20th Century, Huntington found that “no single factor is 
sufficient to explain the development of democracy.”114 Huntington argued that 
democratization is a result of a combination of causes that varies from country to country. 
Huntington suggests that the individual circumstances and influences present in each 
country vary so greatly that it would be difficult to consider a sole factor as the universal 
cause of the success or failure of democratic transition. In investigating what factors or 
change in factors had occurred in the 1960s and 1970s that led to a wave of 
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, Huntington found that the deepening of 
legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes, the unprecedented global economic growth 
of the 1960s, the transition of national churches into the proponents of social, economic, 
and political reform, the promotion of democracy by international forces, and the 
increasing effect of mass communication had all played a significant role in where and 
when democratization occurred. These factors, Huntington found, were all interrelated in 
the democratic transition process.  
Later research, notably from Linz and Stepan, concluded that a different 
combination of factors, interconnect with each other to influence the transition to 
democracy.115 Linz and Stepan's research, conducted in 1996 and focused primarily on 
the post-Soviet states, found that civil society, political society, rule of law, state 
bureaucracy, and economic society were the factors most influencing the transition to 
democracy.116  Moreover, other researchers, namely those focused on Latin American 
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countries, have concluded the transition to democracy is influenced by factors, including 
religion, but also international influences.117  
In the second school of thought, some have questioned Huntington, and by 
extension that of Linz and Stepan, arguing that the successful transition to democracy 
rests with leadership that is determined to transition the nation to democracy. Dankwart 
Rustow, for instance, has observed that the success of the democratic transition can 
completely on the degree of nationalism combined with the determination of the regime 
and the charisma of the leadership.118 This suggests that while there indeed might be 
other factors contributing to the successful transition to liberal democracy, the movement 
towards democracy could not be possible without leadership to guide the state through 
the process. 
 While this paper does not necessarily challenge either of those discussions, it does 
offer the significance of religion as a singularly consideration in democratic transition. 
There are, in fact, several examples of where religion has been found to be the decisive 
factor in whether or not the state successfully navigates the transition to democracy. One 
has to look no further than Chile and Peru, for instance, to learn of the immense 
importance of the Catholic Church in the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in favor of 
democracy.119 Specifically in case of Chile, the Catholic Church supported opposition 
groups, lent credibility to opposition leaders, and eventually brought the authoritarian 
dictator, Augusto Pinochet, to the negotiating table.120 There are other successful 
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examples of democracies where religion plays an active and vital role, including Israel, 
India, and even the United Kingdom. Israel, for example, successfully transitioned to a 
liberal democratic state out of near nothingness with the Jewish religion as a key element of 
its national identity.121 One might also consider the United Kingdom as an example of 
where religion and democracy coexisted during transition. The United Kingdom, after all, 
is often referenced as one of the world's strongest democracies, but it is important to 
remember that even today, it actually has an official state religion, the Church of England, 
which plays an active role in the liberal democracy. Currently, for example, there are 26 
seats in the United Kingdom's upper chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords, which 
are held and reserved for the clergy of the Church of England.122  With these examples, it 
is clear that religion can play a key role in the transition to democracy and can coexist 
within liberal democracy.  
 
Religion Policy Choices during Liberal Democratic Transition 
 Next, let's consider the choices regarding religious policies that are available to a 
state that must navigate the daunting task of transitioning to liberal democracy. First, 
Alfred Stepan argued for the theory of 'twin toleration' because he recognized that in 
many cases, religious institutions could not be completely isolated from governance and 
society. Stepan's theory conditioned that in order for democracy and religion to coexist, 
there needed to be balance or 'twin toleration' where government encourages religious 
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freedom while being mindful of not allowing religious institutions to “authoritatively 
mandate public policy to democratically elected governments.”123 An important 
consideration here is that the crux of Stepan's position is that the democratic state and 
religion can coexist and even be intertwined in a successful democracy; the United 
Kingdom is again a relevant example here.  
 Secondly, states might also choose policies that adhere to the theory of a strict 
separation of church and state. Thomas Jefferson famously wrote about the necessity of 
“a wall of separation between Church and State” in his letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association in 1802.124 In other words, the state ought to seek to establish policies that 
clearly detach religious influence from governmental affairs. There are many political 
theorists, including Audi, who argue for states to maintain this separation as a necessary 
prescription for the establishment of a successful democracy.    
 And third, states might choose policies that are more closely aligned to the 
controversial theory of religious democracy. Here, the state's secular leaders, legislation, 
and policies are subject to religious approval. There are plenty of credible arguments 
against this form of governance, who often question whether a religious democracy could 
be defined as a democracy at all.125  That argument notwithstanding, there are those who 
believe that the current Iranian system, established in the early 1980s, is indeed the first 
of form of and emerging religious democracy. Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, 
who argues that religion is a complimentary ingredient in a functioning democracy, 
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heralds the theory of religious democracy.126 In this form of democracy, religious 
ideology permeates through all facets of government and policy and the balance with 
democracy is able to be harmonized because the vast majority of the state's population 
holds the same faith structure and religious belief. Religion, has a final say in all policy 
decisions, but because the vast majority of the state's citizens are of the same religion, the 
democracy – in theory – functions. 
 
Liberal Democracy and Religious Policy from the Liberal and Realist Perspective 
 The religious policy choices available to liberal democracies are entirely rooted in 
liberalist theory. Liberal theory on the relationship between a liberal democracy and its 
religious policies is best described by John Rawls in his infamous work, Political 
Liberalism. Rawls, in liberalist fashion, strongly defends the need for the separation of 
church in state in liberal democracy. Rawls described 3 reasons for the need of separation 
of church and state: “It protects religion from the state and the state from religion; it 
protects citizens from their churches (by protecting the freedom to choose or change 
one’s faith).”127 Rawls theory rests on the overall idea that in a liberal democracy, the 
protection of associational and individual liberties is paramount. This liberalist approach 
to religious policy is echoed in Stephan’s twin tolerations, which was discussed earlier in 
relation to religious policy choices and certainly in Robert Audi and Thomas Jefferson’s 
argument for the need for separation of church and state in a successful liberal 
democracy.  
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 On the other hand, the realist view of religious policy in a liberal democracy is 
rooted in the works of Machiavelli, Thucydides, and Thomas Hobbes. For the realist, the 
liberal democracy or any other form of government for the matter, need not be concerned 
as much with individual or associational liberties as it is with the protection of the state 
and its interests. For classical realists such as Machiavelli, the state should act in such a 
way as to secure state interest (power/security) over ideology.128 Machiavelli is mostly 
trivial in his treatment of the role of religion and religious policy in the state, except for 
declaring that states dominated by religion need not be governed at all.129 For later 
realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau, the state’s relationship with religion is viewed as 
largely inconsequential. Morgenthau theorized that “statesmen think and act in terms of 
the interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.”130 
In essence, the realist views religious policy as subjugated to state interest and security.  
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that the evidence will show that state religious policy 
significantly impacts a state’s transition to liberal democracy. While states might 
acknowledge the importance of the separation between church and state in terms of 
religious policy, their practice, in line with realist theory will reflect a paramount focus on 
maintaining power and security. Additionally, religious policy will be the catalyst that 
leads to a withdrawal from the transition to liberal democracy.  
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 The following is the rationale behind the case study selection of Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. It was important that this study focus on two states with similar backgrounds 
and populations. It was equally important that the states also be pursuing independence in 
the same time period so as to avoid uneven comparison influenced by what could be 
unequal outside global trend influences. Additionally, there needed to be evidence that 
religion ought to be investigated as having a role during the transition to democracy. 
Moreover, specifically related to the question under consideration in this paper, it became 
more useful to look at the assessments of countries that most would be considered as 
actively making the transition to democracy. In other words, the particular interest is in 
those countries that have clearly undergone a substantial change in form of government 
during the past 25 years and have indicated the intention of establishing a democracy. In 
this regard, we have narrowed the selection to the former Soviet Union. While the former 
Soviet states certainly differ greatly from the Middle East in terms of demographics, 
geography, and a whole host of other factors, the similarity exists in that new states that 
were essentially born overnight and had to determine the appropriate path, including in 
terms of religious policy, to take during the formation of new governments and the 
transition to democracy.  We are not assessing the Arab Spring states because we feel that 
the situations there are so fresh and in such a state of flux that any assessment as to their 
progress would change too quickly for appropriate study. 
 First, it should be of little surprise to most readers that among the states that rank 
highest on Freedom House's annual overall assessment of democracy are states like the 





scores of 'free' in terms of liberal democracy in its 2012 report.131 Specific to the religious 
element, all of these countries have policies that protect religious liberty, treat religions 
equally, and have established records where religions are treated with neutrality under the 
law. Of course, it could be argued that none of these states are in the midst of what one 
might call a “transition to democracy” and none of these states were selected to serve as 
case studies here because of this fact. It is important, however, to list them here in order 
to provide context.  
 With the above in mind, there are at least 3 former Soviet States that, as of 2012, 
had achieved the rating of 'free' from Freedom House both in terms of political rights and 
civil liberties to include religious policies. Those states include Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania.  These former eastern bloc Soviet states were not selected because, historically 
and culturally, they had very little in common with one another or the other former Soviet 
republics and “the general sentiment (in those countries) was always very negative 
towards the Soviet Union.”132 Additionally, there is strong evidence as pointed out in a 
2005 European Union Special Commission report, which found that in all of these states, 
a majority of citizens do not profess any faith or religious allegiance.133  Moreover, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the only former Soviet republics where neither Russian 
Orthodox nor Islam was large enough to be the dominant religion. This suggests that, on 
the whole, these states would not serve as good case studies in assessing religious policy 
during a transition to liberal democracy because religion is not a major factor in the social 
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construct. Additionally, because of the societal construct and the influence of other 
nearby existing European democracies were already in place in these countries, there are 
better examples of post-Soviet states navigating the transition to democracy, which will 
be covered later. 
  Next, there are some former Soviet states that achieved Freedom House's ranking 
of 'partly free' as of 2012 including Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. 
Unfortunately, Armenia cannot be considered in this paper because it already had an 
official state religion, Christianity, which is administered by the Armenian Apostolic 
Orthodox Church, the world's oldest state church.134 Georgia is not under consideration 
because there is concern that its proximity to Europe might unfairly be influencing its 
transition to democracy than the somewhat isolated states of Central Asia. Ukraine was 
also discounted from case study consideration here as it is in the midst of ongoing turmoil 
and its political structure is undergoing significant strain.  And, Russia itself is not under 
consideration because most government policies there in the post-Soviet era have largely 
been focused on maintaining the status quo. 135 Again, because of current political 
turmoil, Ukraine would not be a good case study here nor would Russia itself (which 
Freedom House lists as 'not free') in terms of the transition to democracy. The only 'partly 
free' post-Soviet state to withstand the assessment of Freedom House and the principals 
described in this paper is Kyrgyzstan, which will serve as one of the case studies later in 
this paper. 
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 Finally, there are 7 former Soviet Republics that Freedom House judged are 'not 
free' democracies as of 2012. They include Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Interestingly, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all exhibit extremely similar characteristics in 
terms of their autocratic governments, strict religious policies, and denial of civil 
liberties. Of these states, however, only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have ever even 
claimed to be interested in looking at a transitioning to democracy.136 In other words, 
these two countries are the only to meet this paper's criteria of interest in the transition to 
democracy. Because, as of this writing, Kazakhstan is in the process of formulating its 
latest round of state religious policy - which there is large debate about where those 
policies will take the country, we have selected Uzbekistan as a stable marker of a 'not 
free' autocratic regime judged as not transitioning to democracy.137 
  Before continuing into the case studies, it is important to provide a bit of 
historical context so that the entire process of the transition to democracy can be 
understood relative to the cases being highlighted. In essence, it is worthwhile to know 
the starting point for the transition by reviewing the state of affairs prior to the start 
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The Role of the Soviet Union 
Indeed the fall of the Soviet Union and the birth of independent states like 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan present a rather unique example of a transition to liberal 
democracy because as they began their path to independence, they had to make religious 
policy decisions after having been part of a larger nation that had seen little need for 
religion. It is important to note here that both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been part 
of Russian territory since the 19th Century and had both endured the entirety of the 
transition into and out of the Soviet system.  
 During the Soviet days, the larger state, and the communist system, provided the 
framework and stability under which society needed to operate. Religion was seen as a 
possible competitor and destabilizer to the Soviet form of government. The anti-religious 
Soviet policies date back to just prior to the formation of the Soviet Union following the 
October Revolution of 1917. The Soviet of People’s Commissars - the entity formed to 
transition the Russian government functions and laws into the Soviet model - decreed on 
January 12, 1918 several very strict and binding laws against religious freedom.138 The 
laws basically depraved Soviet citizens of religious freedom, banned religious institutions 
from owning property or buildings, and gave the state control over where and how 
religious gatherings or formations could take place. To give greater context to the impact 
of this decree, consider that prior to the 1918 declaration, there were an estimated 46,000 
church congregations of the Russian Orthodox Church alone across the Soviet Union.  By 
1939, the total number of Russian Orthodox churches was below 2,000 nationwide.139  
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The concern, for Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin and his supporters, clearly was that 
since the Soviet system required the loyalty of the citizen, that loyalty should not be 
shared with any other entity. Interestingly, item 13 of Article 2 of the 1918 Russian 
Constitution passed July 10, 1918 stated, “For the purpose of securing to the workers real 
freedom of conscience, the church is to be separated from the state and the school from 
the church, and the right of religious and anti-religious propaganda is accorded to every 
citizen.”140 But it is fairly evident that Lenin who like Karl Marx, famously regarded 
religion as “opium for the people,” had no intention of guaranteeing any sort of religious 
freedom.141  
One of Lenin’s successors, Joseph Stalin, saw a need to go further in limiting 
religious freedom than Lenin. On the surface, Stalin’s 1936 Soviet Constitution gave 
Soviet citizens the right to religious confession and seemingly implied a new era of 
religious tolerance. The trouble was while people were indeed permitted to profess a 
religion, the only group that Stalin’s government allowed to promulgate its views was the 
atheists142. Later, Stalin would create a government entity called the Council of Religious 
Affairs, specifically to monitor the religious institutions that did exist in the Soviet 
Union. Under the Soviet system, law gave the Council of Religious Affairs the 
responsibility of recognizing or forbidding whatever religion it chose by requiring 
congregations to register with the government, which usually refused to issue a permit.143 
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There was yet a 3rd Soviet Constitution adopted in 1977. Article 34 of Chapter 6 
of the 1977 Constitution declared all Soviet citizens “equal before the law, without 
distinction of origin, social or property status, race or nationality, sex, education, 
language, attitude to religion.”144 The 1977 Constitution also specifically addressed 
religion in Article 42 of Chapter 6 declaring “Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed 
freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to 
conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility or hatred on 
religious grounds is prohibited.”145 However, the Soviet Constitution proved to be a 
document with riddled with qualifications because in other articles, including 47 and 51, 
it specified that individual liberties are only granted in accordance with the “goals of the 
building of communism;” that qualification, effectively meant that those seeking 
religious liberty were left without legal cause to challenge the state. 
By the late 1980’s, however, the Soviet clamp on religion did begin to weaken 
under the stewardship of Mikhail Gorbachev. As the Soviet Union slowly began its 
voluntary and involuntary transition into today’s Russian Federation, Soviet law began to 
take a more accepting view of religion. In fact, laws passed between1988 through the 
Soviet Union’s eventual collapse in 1991 began to provide protections to religious 
institutions against government persecution.146  
Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, there are countless other examples of 
religious persecution and intolerance to varying degrees far too many than is necessary 
for the scope of this paper. And, it is worthwhile to contemplate the long-lasting 
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generational effects the government intolerance might have had on religious identity in 
the Soviet Union. In essence, for the better part of 70 years, religion no matter the form 
was effectively subjugated to the state.  
As Michael Bordeaux said of the Soviet Union, “no society has ever experienced 
communism before, therefore there are no guidelines for the emergence from it.147” 
Bordeaux’s comment is almost an understatement regarding the complexities of 
transitioning a society from the rigidity of totalitarianism to democracy almost overnight. 
 
The Birth of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
Almost immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet 
republics of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan along with all of the rest of the independent 
states had to reinvent themselves as nation states. Of course, the entire process of 
independence had already begun under the Soviet regime. There were strong calls for 
nationalism as a way of unifying citizens under the particular banner of their independent 
state. The Soviets had felt it best to boost the national consciousness of the people, “but 
in a controlled way so as to avoid the emergence of aggressive forms of nationalism.”148  
Riding the wave of this nationalization, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan drafted 
new constitutions. Language was seen as a way of elevating nationalism and both 
governments quickly replaced Russian as the state language with Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
respectively. Religion, of course, began taking on a whole new importance and that 
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seemed to catch both governments off guard. After all, the leadership managing the 
transition in both countries was still basically Soviet.   
The populations of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have similar characteristics. 
Both have majority indigenous ethnic populations and both have strong religious 
heritage. There is also an element that is important to note in the formation of Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. The political map that was used to determine the borders of the new 
independent states of Central Asia was basically a remnant of the Stalin era.149 
Specifically, in the territory designated as Kyrgyzstan, figures available from a late 1980s 
census listed Kyrgyz as the largest ethnic group at over 52%, followed by Russians at 
21%, Uzbeks at 13%, and other smaller minority groups accounting for the rest.150 In 
terms of religion, some 75% of Kyrgyz identified themselves as being affiliated with 
Islam - namely Sunni Islam - while another 16% said Russian Orthodox, with 4 % 
identified as having no religious affiliation, and the rest are affiliated with smaller 
religious groups.151  
Census data, also from the late 1980s, estimated that in the territory belonging to 
Uzbekistan, some 71% of the population was Uzbek, followed by Russians at 8%, Tajiks 
at 5%, and the rest of smaller ethic groups. Figures available from the early 1990s 
estimated that approximately 90% of the people of Uzbekistan were Sunni Muslim, 
although they practiced a much muted form of Islam compared to the Middle East.152  
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Given those circumstances and the push for nationalism, Islam was seen by many as a 
“natural rallying point for a new collective identity” for the new nation.153   
In the early days of the formation of Kyrgyzstan, the country's new President 
Askar Akayev seemed to readily embrace the movement to democracy. Because religious 
practice and belief were muted, given that despite such a seemingly large Islamic 
population, less than 20% of the Kyrgyzstan population described themselves as trying to 
abide by their religions practices, the nationalism rally seemed to work.154 While there 
were no large scaled religious movements against the regime in the country's formative 
years, Akayev remained concerned however, that religious radicals, especially those 
affiliated with an Islamic group called Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) would create instability. The 
group, with stated claims of a desire to create an Islamic Caliphate, had started in the late 
1990s and had set up a base of operations in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan.155 Akayev 
banned HT and accused it of being aligned with Islamic radicals in neighboring 
Uzbekistan and claimed the group received guerrilla training from the neighboring 
Taliban government in Afghanistan.156 Though the group claimed only peaceful 
intentions, Akayev had HT members arrested by police and he was largely successful in 
preventing HT from mounting any credible threat to his regime. 
At first, like Kyrgyzstan, it seemed as though Uzbekistan would welcome the new 
rallying religious nationalism, but given that the transitioning government soon began to 
become highly suspicious of the ultimate intentions of some of the religious groups. 
                                                          
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Alisher Khamidov. “AsiaNet Human Rights”. EurasiaNet.org, Headlines | EurasiaNet.org. 






Uzbekistan had declared independence on September 1, 1991.157 Shortly thereafter, in 
early 1992, a group of radical Islamist youth took over the local headquarters of the 
former Communist party in a town in the Ferghana Valley called Namangan. The group 
had been demanding that Sharia Law be instituted throughout the region and they even 
proposed establishing an Islamic caliphate across Uzbekistan and the region. The newly 
elected President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov saw the group as a threat to the fledgling 
nation and decided to take swift action against the group and its supporters. Karimov 
launched a massive police crackdown on anyone associated with the Islamic group. The 
government succeeded in running a good number of the groups' most violent and 
dangerous figures out of the country. While the Karimov government prevailed, this 
event marked the beginning of Uzbekistan's rocky and at times violent relationship with 
religion and religious-based groups. In late 1992 and 1993, coinciding with the 
formulation of the Uzbek Constitution, the Karimov regime ordered the expulsion of 
Saudi Islamist missionaries, closed down Islamist newspapers, and even closed down 
some Islamic schools.158  
 
Case Study  
Though written and debated within separate political spheres, both Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan chose to model their constitutions very closely after the Soviet 
constitution, which as described earlier, often read very much in line with the 
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fundamentals of liberal democracy. Specific to religious policy, both included language 
professing a separation between church and state and guaranteeing most religious 
freedoms. The trouble is that often in the same breath, both constitutions – like the Soviet 
Union – provided powers to the state that effectively gave the state control over religion 
and subjugated religious organizations and leaders to state-controlled bureaucracies.  
Once the constitutions were adopted, the governments of both Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan chose very similar, Soviet-like methods of suppressing religious activity, out 
of concern of the emergence of extremist groups. The deduction here is that given that the 
leadership of both states was saturated by politicians who were schooled under Soviet 
tutorship, they retained some of the same paranoia and reverted to methods they were 
familiar with and that had worked. 
What follows in this section is a detailed description of the summary just 
provided. This section is broken into four parts that provide further elaboration. In the 
first two parts, we look at the founding principles of Uzbekistan as described in its 
founding Constitution. The treatment of religion is reviewed in the document and then 
compared with how the government actually practiced those principles. The second two 
parts cover Kyrgyzstan’s Constitution in terms of religious policy followed by how the 
state treated religion is practice.  
 
The Constitution of Uzbekistan  
 The Karimov regime in Uzbekistan saw religion, particularly Islam, as a part of 
the cultural heritage of the nation but it remained extremely leery of any religious 





religious policy intent on remaining firmly in control of religious expression. To 
spearhead Uzbekistan’s religious policy, Karimov borrowed from old Soviet policy to 
create a government religious entity designed to be state-controlled religious bureaucracy.  
The Uzbek Constitution was adopted on December 8, 1992. It established the 
nation as “a sovereign democratic republic.”159 It outlined the elements of democracy 
including that the government would be of, by, and for the people. Specifically, the 
Uzbek Constitution created a representational elected assembly, called Oily Majles or 
Supreme Assembly, and the office of a popularly elected President.160 The Constitution 
also outlined the responsibilities of the democratically modeled executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government in line with Western fundamentals. 
First, while not specifically mentioning the word “liberty,” the Constitution does 
say under Chapter 7, Article 31 that “Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all.  
Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any religion.  Any compulsory 
imposition of religion shall be impermissible.”  
The Uzbek Constitution also requires the state itself to treat religions equally. In 
Chapter 5 Article 18 that “All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have equal 
rights and freedoms, and shall be equal before the law, without distinction by sex, race, 
nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, individual and social status.” 
There was however, an important clause to this article, which suggested the government 
has ‘control’ of these freedoms. The article continues with the phrase, “Any privileges 
may be granted solely by the law and shall conform to the principles of social justice.” 
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This is an important caveat that Karimov exploited to later create a state-controlled 
religious bureaucracy. Later, Chapter 13 Article 61 of the Constitution states “Religious 
organizations and associations shall be separated from the state and equal before the law.  
The state shall not interfere with the activity of religious associations.” 161 
Finally, with regard to religious neutrality, the Uzbek Constitution in Chapter 13, 
Article 61, states, “Religious organizations and associations shall be separated from the 
state and equal before the law.  The state shall not interfere with the activity of religious 
associations.”162 Again, here all of the principles of religious policy in democracy are 
explicitly present in the Uzbek Constitution. 
 
 
Uzbekistan’s Religious Policy in Practice 
 While Uzbekistan’s Constitution clearly outlined a separation of church and state 
and places an emphasis on democratic principles in line with Jefferson's wall of 
separation, subsequent law and government policy appear to be completely at odds. For 
example, the state has passed laws requiring all religious organizations to register with 
the state – just like Soviet law – and the state has also secured the right to regulate 
religious activities.  
 Again, the Ferghana incident with the Islamists fueled this great government 
skepticism of religion in Uzbekistan. As clashes between the government and Islamists 
continued throughout the 1990s, Uzbek law started to backtrack further and further. In 
1997, for example, the government began actively targeting and closing any religious 







sanctuary or school that did not officially register with the state.163 Later, the state ordered 
the removal of all loudspeakers from mosques across the country in the name of 
preserving social order.164 Though the Uzbek government clearly directed most of its 
attention towards Islamic groups, given that some 90% of the Uzbek population 
identified itself as having some sort of ties to the Islamic faith, the government also 
focused on other religions and groups. In 1998, The Uzbek government passed the Law 
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which required non-
governmental organizations and associations to register with the government and receive 
permits and approval from the government for all their operations. The law also made 
“any unregistered religious activity or unofficial religious speech” illegal.165  
 Perhaps most troubling of all, particularly for Uzbeks of the Islamic faith, was the 
1998  Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which required every 
religious leader to pass a government imposed test before they could be allowed to lead 
an Islamic worship or teach in an Islamic school. “The test included questions outside the 
traditional sphere of a religious cleric and is often used to weed out unwanted clerics.”166 
The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations also included an 
outright ban on proselytizing. That is to say that any religious element can be arrested, 
deported, or imprisoned for attempting to recruit or convert others to a particular faith.  
 The Uzbek government also created the Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA), 
which is a Soviet-modeled state-controlled religious bureaucracy responsible for 
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oversight of all of the religious activities that take place in the country. The CRA, mindful 
of the country's large Islamic following decreed, “All mosques and Islamic education 
must be affiliated to the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (MBU). The MBU is headed by a 
mufti who is nominated by the Muslim Council of Uzbekistan (MCU), a representative 
body consisting of imams and elders from all regions of the country; the candidate must 
then be approved by the government.”167 
 
The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan 
It is appropriate to continue the case study with a comparison of the founding 
religious principles in place in Kyrgyzstan. The first Kyrgyzstan Constitution was 
adopted on 5 May 1993. In terms of democratic substance, Article 1 clearly defines 
Kyrgyzstan as a secular, democratic, republic. There have been 7 versions of the 
Kyrgyzstan Constitution including the original 1993, including amendments in 1996, 
2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. The reason for the many versions has been a power 
struggle between expanding and limiting the powers of either the office of the President 
or the Parliament. Here we focus on the founding principles of the 1993 Constitution as it 
relates to religion because as the U.S. Department of State noted, there were no changes 
in the various constitutions that impacted religious affairs.168 
In terms of democratic religious principles, Kyrgyzstan stacks up just as well as 
Uzbekistan. In Section 13, Article 3, the constitution grants all citizens equality declaring, 
“In the Kyrgyz Republic everyone shall be equal before the law and the courts. No one 
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shall be subjected to any kind of discrimination or violation of their rights and freedoms 
on grounds of ethnic origin, sex, race, nationality, language, religious denomination, 
political or religious beliefs or any other personal or social circumstances.” According to 
Section 8, Article 1, Kyrgyzstan directs the state to observe neutrality and explicitly states 
“in the Kyrgyz Republic no religion shall be recognized as the state religion or mandatory 
religion.”  
Article 5 of the Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations state that 
the government cannot “interfere with the activity of religious organizations that adhere 
to established laws, does not allow for establishing advantages or restrictions of one 
religion over another, does not finance the activity of religious organizations and activity 
of propagating atheism.” The constitution also not only protects the rights of believers, 
but explicitly the rights of non-believers. Article 14, Section 5 says “Everyone shall be 
guaranteed freedom of religion and atheistic views.” However, the Kyrgyz Constitution 
also caveats that the “establishment of political parties on a religious basis and the pursuit 
by religious organizations of political goals and tasks” shall be forbidden. It also goes so 
far as to warn religious leaders specifically by declaring that “interference by religious 
organizations and ministers of religious faiths in the activity of state bodies” is forbidden 
as well.  
Finally, Article 85 of the Kyrgyz Constitution gives power to the nation’s court 
system in determining “the constitutionality of a religious organization's activities.”  
 





As outlined, in Kyrgyzstan, like Uzbekistan, there is the constitutional foundation 
for democratic religious policy closely aligned with the theory of strict separation of 
church and state. In practice, however, Kyrgyzstan has many similarities to Uzbekistan in 
violating those principles. In Kyrgyzstan, all religions are required to register with the 
government, which has the final overall approval. There is a cabinet level organization 
called State Agency for Religious Affairs (SRA), which monitors all religious activity 
and has been known to take action to stop religious activities that the state views are 
inciting instability.169 According to a 2010 United Nations report “Religious leaders are at 
risk of being deported if they take any sort of action that displeases the SRA. The 
government tightly controls the religious material that travels in and out of the country, 
often depriving religious groups of the material that they need to adequately perform 
worship.”170 
The same United Nations report noted “Kyrgyzstan has a long history of raids and 
crackdowns on religious groups and justifies them as national security measures that 
protect public morality.”171 The report found that while missionary groups were often 
permitted to operate freely in the country for the most part, if the government views any 
of their activities questionable, they are subject to expulsion. The report found that at 
least 20 different missionary groups had been banned from the country since 1991 with 
the Kyrgyz government claiming that the various groups were “not compatible with the 
general principles accepted by world religious groups.”172 
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 In what can only be seen as a direct challenge to democratic religious ideals, the 
Kyrgyz government issued a decree in 2006 that listed Russian Orthodox and Islam as the 
“traditional religions” of the state.173 For the first time, this suggested that Kyrgyzstan 
was considering an official religion or religions.  
 With a large Islamic population, the government of Kyrgyzstan, like Uzbekistan 
has a government organization to provide oversight; it is called the Administration of 
Muslims n Kyrgyzstan. 174 The entity standardizes all Islamic education, bans materials 
that do not adhere to government standards, and has the authority to ban religious leaders 
from practicing. There is also the Coordinating Council on the Struggle against Religious 
Extremism, which is made up of various government appointed religious leaders and 
even members of the National Security Intelligence Service (NSS) or secret police. The 




 As the research has shown, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are what realists 
would probably call perfect case studies. In both cases, there were leaders whose 
populations supported the move to independence and toward establishing a liberal 
democracy form of government. But the leader’s, in concurrence with realist theory, 
elected to establish secular governments that that each granted some level of religious 
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freedoms, which were, then promptly subjugated to the state. The research revealed that, 
in the interests of security and power consolidation, both governments sought to 
dismantle the individual liberty of religious choice and even association by creating 
bureaucracies to monitor and oversee all aspects of religion in the state. Perhaps, the 
leaders of both countries had taken notes from the Prince advised by Machiavelli. 
 What then, if any, were the key areas of differences that explain why Kyrgyzstan 
is now being judged to be making steady progress in the transition to liberal democracy? 
We have two countries, with markedly similar realist approaches to religious policy, 
government formation, and the practice of governing. While Karimov has remained atop 
the Uzbekistan autocracy, it took Kyrgyzstan two revolutions to finally achieve marked 
improvement in the pursuit of liberal democracy. The impetus for change and real 
democratic progress appears to be the change in regime. 
 Kyrgyzstan had followed the same path as Uzbekistan under the stewardship of 
President Askar Akayev, who ruled the country for the 15 years following the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Following what was believed to be a engineered and corrupt Parliamentary 
election on March 13, 2005, protests and unrest grew around Kyrgyzstan.176 Akayev's 
political opposition, the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK) began to organize the 
protests in what became known as “The Tulip Revolution” to demand a new and fair 
election.177 Akayev had previously ordered the arrest of opposition leader Felix Kulov 
and he further issued orders to the Kyrgyz national police to tamp down the protests and 
take control of media outlets to prevent the opposition message from spreading. 
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International leaders, however, had already began to lend credibility to the opposition by 
questioning the election results, including U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Steven 
Young.178  By March 20, massive protests had spread throughout the country and the 
numbers were so large that Kyrgyz police and military units were severely outnumbered. 
50,000 people were estimated to be in the streets of the southern city of Jalanabad while 
approximately 3,000 had started to gather in the capital of Bishkek.179 After several days 
of clashes with police and growing opposition momentum that continued to be 
encouraged by some in the international community, including Ambassador Young, 
approximately 20,000 people began to protest in Bishkek's central square. And, as Dr. 
Erica Marat observed for the Jamestown Foundation, March 24, 2005, became “an 
important date in the history of Kyrgyzstan. On that day, in less than an hour, a crowd of 
demonstrators seized the Kyrgyz White House in Bishkek, opposition leader Felix Kulov 
was freed from jail and President Askar Akayev reportedly fled the country. Taken 
together, these three events signified the collapse of the Akayev regime.”180   
 Just a mere 5 years later, Kyrgyzstan went through a second revolution. This time, 
the catalyst was the outright financial corruption and mismanagement of public funds by 
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev that was the government’s undoing. Interestingly, Bakiyev 
was from part of the opposition movement that had ousted the Akayev regime for 
corruption years prior. And, while corruption and mismanagement are indeed credited 
with being catalysts for Bakiyev's downfall, the lynchpin appeared to be an incident in 
early April 2010, where government troops, acting seemingly on Bakiyev's orders fired 
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on protestors who had gathered to demonstrate against him in Bishkek.181  The entire 
revolution that followed took place in a matter of only approximately 10 days. As the 
U.K.'s Guardian Newspaper described, “The popular revolt in Kyrgyzstan that toppled 
Bakiyev two days ago (April 6, 2010) was so sudden and ferocious that nobody has had a 
chance to give it a name yet.”182 It is important to note here the striking similarity that 
both Bakiyev and Akayev, while ostensibly from opposing political parties in Kyrgyzstan, 
both had Soviet backgrounds and had been in political positions during the days of the 
Soviet Union and both were essentially learned or were trained to govern under the 
Soviet system.  
 That brings us to emphasize the striking difference between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan and their transition to democracy. It took Kyrgyzstan two revolutions in order 
to finally rid the top leadership of the government of the Soviet tendencies. It also meant 
that future Kyrgyzstan leaders would have to realize that liberal democracy meant the 
leadership was accountable to the citizenry, perhaps the true hallmark of liberal 
democracy.  
 More related to our interests here regarding religious policy, the Kyrgyzstan 
revolutions meant that the citizenry demanded that the government would have to adhere 
to the promises it set forth during the initial transition to liberal democracy. The new 
Krygyz government set in place a new Constitution that limited the powers of the 
President and increased the role of the Parliament. According to Freedom House, since 
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the fall of the Bakiyev regime, the tight official restrictions on religion have not yet been 
altered through legislation but the government has ceased most of its authoritarian 
practices towards religion.183 This suggests that, while Kyrgyzstan is judged to be making 
progress toward liberal democracy, its policy choices are still, very much in line with 
realist theory in that state security and interests continue to take primacy. It is how both 
governments executed their religious policy, through subjugation rather than 'twin 
toleration' that seemingly was the lynchpin in terms of the treatment of religion.  
 Still, the simple fact remains that the fall of the autocracy in Kyrgyzstan appears 
to have had the greatest impact with regards to putting Kyrgyzstan back on the path to 
respecting religious principles in the transition to democracy. While Kyrgyzstan still has a 
precarious path to navigate in terms of its religious policy during the transition to 
democracy, what we see is that the first step is the removal of the autocracy that is 
entrenched in the old way of doing business. 
 
Conclusion 
As the case study has shown, there is real evidence to support realist perspective 
in terms of how transitioning liberal democracies will treat religious policies. While the 
state might appear to give the impression that it respects the importance of ‘twin 
toleration’ between church and state as liberal theory argues, the facts point to the 
primacy of state security and the preservation of state interests, in realist form.  
Perhaps it could be argued that state cannot subjugate individual liberties, such as 
religion, if it is intent on making a good faith effort to transition to liberal democracy. 
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But, as evidenced here, giving the state control over religion can lead to real abuse of 
power in the name of regime survival or national security. Moreover, we have also 
observed that state suppression of religion leads to instability and even a recoil from the 
transition to democracy, as evidenced by Uzbekistan. Referencing the case of Uzbekistan 
in particular, it almost seems that at the very instance there appeared to be a religious-
based threat to the regime, the entire process towards democratic transition appeared to 
slow and the institutions of the former Soviet system began to re-emerge. That also brings 
us to perhaps what is the larger point that, as evidenced in the case of Kyrgyzstan 
juxtaposed to Uzbekistan that it was only with the complete removal of the “old guard” 
regime that the transition to democracy was judged to be progressing steadily.   
It is worth noting that the reason Kyrgyzstan seems to be making progress at 
transitioning to liberal democracy is because there is a sense that the government is 
accountable to the people. The people have successfully demonstrated the will and desire 
to demand adherence to democratic principles from their leaders. Two successful 
revolutions prove that the Kyrgyz population is collectively more willing and able than 
the population of Uzbekistan to demand accountability. Conversely, in Uzbekistan, where 
Karimov has succeeded in maintaining his grip on power, the transition to democracy 
seems idle.  
Additionally, this research has demonstrated that while religious policy is an 
important factor, the transition to liberal democracy seems to be heavily reliant on the 
system of government that existed prior to the beginning of the transition to liberal 
democracy. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan relied heavily on the influences of the 





that had existed under the previous form of government. There is an interesting point to 
highlight here that begs the question of whether true change in governance is possible if it 
is led by those who are so accustomed to previous ways of doing business – the very 
methods that led to the demand for change in the first place.  
Finally, we are brought to the larger point supporting Huntington’s argument that 
not religion alone or any singular factor is the catalyst in determining the successful 
transition to democracy. History tells us that there were indeed many factors at play in the 
downfall of the Soviet Union, probably the least of which was religion. Then looking at 
the birth of new states, with large religious populations, intent on successfully 
transitioning to liberal democracy, we offer religion to be an important factor although we 







Appendix 1 – Combined Political Terror Score Human Rights Record and Freedom 
House Liberal Democracy Comparison Chart 
*Highlight indicates liberal democracy under consideration. 
   2012 2013 
Country Region Income amnesty  state state 
  Level    
Afghanistan sa li 4 4 5 
Albania eca lmi 1 3 2 
Algeria mena umi 2 2 2 
Angola ssa umi 3 3 3 
Argentina lac umi 1 2 2 
Armenia eca lmi 2 3 3 
Australia eap hi 1 1 1 
Austria eca hi 1 1 1 
Azerbaijan eca umi 3 3 3 
Bahamas lac hi 2 2 2 
Bahrain mena hi 3 3 3 
Bangladesh sa li 3 4 4 
Barbados lac hi   1 1 
Belarus eca umi 2 3 3 
Belgium eca hi 1 1 1 
Belize lac lmi   2 2 
Benin ssa li 1 2 2 
Bhutan sa lmi  2 2 
Bolivia lac lmi 2 2 2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina eca umi 1 2 2 
Botswana ssa umi   2 1 
Brazil lac umi 4 4 4 
Brunei eap hi  1 1 
Bulgaria eca umi 1 1 2 
Burkina Faso ssa li 1 2 3 
Burundi ssa li 3 4 4 
Cambodia eap li 3 3 3 
Cameroon ssa lmi 2 3 3 
Canada na hi 1 1 1 
Cape Verde ssa lmi   1 2 
Central African Republic ssa li 3 5 5 
Chad ssa li 3 3 3 
Chile lac umi 2 2 2 
China eap umi 4 4 4 
Colombia lac umi 4 3 4 
Comoros ssa li  2 1 
Congo ssa lmi 2 3 3 
Costa Rica lac umi   2 2 
Croatia eca hi 1 1 1 
Cuba lac umi 3 3 3 





Czechoslovakia eca hi    
Czech Republic eca hi 1 1 1 
Dem. Republic of the Congo ssa li 5 5 5 
Denmark eca hi 1 1 1 
Djibouti mena lmi  3 3 
Dominican Republic lac umi 3 3 3 
East Timor (Timor L'este) eap lmi 2 2 2 
Ecuador lac umi 2 3 2 
Egypt mena lmi 3 3 4 
El Salvador lac lmi 1 3 3 
Equatorial Guinea ssa hi 3 3 3 
Eritrea ssa li 5 4 4 
Estonia eca hi 1 1 1 
Ethiopia ssa li 4 3 3 
Fiji eap lmi 2 2 2 
Finland  eca hi 1 1 1 
France eca hi 2 1 1 
Gabon ssa umi  2 2 
Gambia ssa li 3 3 3 
Georgia eca lmi 2 3 2 
Germany eca hi 1 1 1 
Germany, East eca     
Germany, West eca hi    
Ghana ssa lmi 2 3 2 
Greece eca hi 2 2 1 
Grenada lac umi   1 1 
Guatemala lac lmi 2 3 2 
Guinea  ssa li 3 3 3 
Guinea-Bissau ssa li 3 3 2 
Guyana lac lmi 2 2 2 
Haiti lac li 3 3 3 
Honduras lac lmi 2 3 3 
Hungary eca hi 1 2 2 
Iceland eca hi   1 1 
India sa lmi 4 4 4 
Indonesia eap lmi 3 3 3 
Iran mena umi 4 4 4 
Iraq mena lmi 4 4 5 
Ireland eca hi 1 1 1 
Israel and Occupied Territories** mena hi 4 4 4 
Italy eca hi 1 2 2 
Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire) ssa lmi 4 4 3 
Jamaica lac umi 3 3 3 
Japan eap hi 2 1 1 
Jordan mena umi 3 3 3 
Kazakhstan eca umi 3 3 3 
Kenya ssa li 3 4 4 





Kuwait mena hi 2 2 2 
Kyrgyz Republic eca li 3 3 3 
Laos eap lmi 2 2 2 
Latvia eca umi 1 2 1 
Lebanon mena umi 3 3 3 
Lesotho ssa lmi   2 2 
Liberia ssa li 2 2 2 
Libya mena umi 4 4 4 
Lithuania eca umi 1 2 1 
Luxembourg eca hi   1 1 
Macedonia eca umi 2 2 2 
Madagascar ssa li 4 3 3 
Malawi ssa li 2 3 2 
Malaysia eap umi 3 2 2 
Maldives sa umi 3 2 1 
Mali ssa li 4 3 4 
Malta eca hi 1 1 1 
Mauritania ssa li 3 2 2 
Mauritius  ssa umi   2 2 
Mexico lac umi 4 4 4 
Moldova eca lmi 2 3 2 
Mongolia eap lmi 1 2 2 
Montenegro eca umi 1 2 2 
Morocco mena lmi 3 3 3 
Mozambique ssa li 3 3 3 
Myanmar eap li 4 4 4 
Namibia ssa umi 2 2 2 
Nepal sa li 3 3 2 
Netherlands eca hi 1 1 1 
New Zealand eap hi 1 1 1 
Nicaragua lac lmi 2 3 3 
Niger ssa li 2 2 3 
Nigeria ssa lmi 4 4 4 
North Korea (Democratc People's Republic of Korea) eap li 5 5 5 
Norway eca hi 1 1 1 
Oman mena hi 2 2 3 
Pakistan sa lmi 5 5 5 
Panama lac umi 2 2 2 
Papua New Guinea eap lmi 2 2 2 
Paraguay lac lmi 1 3 3 
Peru lac lmi 3 3 3 
Philippines eap lmi 4 4 4 
Poland eca umi 1 2 1 
Portugal eca hi 1 2 2 
Qatar mena hi 1 1 2 
Romania eca umi 2 2 2 
Russia eca umi 4 4 4 





Samoa eap umi   1 1 
Sao Tome and Principe ssa lmi   1 1 
Saudi Arabia mena hi 3 3 3 
Senegal ssa lmi 3 3 2 
Serbia eca umi 2 2 2 
Serbia and Montenegro eca umi    
Seychelles ssa umi  1 2 
Sierra Leone ssa li 2 3 3 
Singapore eap hi 2 1 1 
Slovakia eca hi 1 1 1 
Slovenia eca hi 1 1 1 
Solomon Islands eap lmi  1 1 
Somalia ssa li 5 4 4 
South Africa ssa umi 3 4 4 
South Korea (Republic of Korea) eap hi 2 1 1 
South Sudan ssa lmi 4 4 5 
Spain eca hi 2 1 1 
Sri Lanka sa lmi 4 4 4 
St. Lucia lac umi   2 2 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines lac umi   1 2 
Sudan ssa lmi 5 5 5 
Suriname lac umi 1 2 2 
Swaziland ssa lmi 3 3 3 
Sweden eca hi 1 1 1 
Switzerland eca hi 1 1 1 
Syria mena lmi 5 5 5 
Taiwan eap hi 1 1 1 
Tajikistan eca li 3 3 3 
Tanzania ssa li 2 3 3 
Thailand eap umi 3 4 3 
Togo ssa li 3 2 1 
Trinidad and Tobago lac hi 2 2 2 
Tunisia mena umi 3 2 3 
Turkey eca umi 3 3 4 
Turkmenistan eca umi 3 3 3 
Uganda ssa li 3 3 3 
Ukraine eca lmi 3 3 3 
United Arab Emirates mena hi 2 2 3 
United Kingdom eca hi 1 1 1 
United States na hi 3     
Uruguay lac umi 1 1 1 
USSR eca     
Uzbekistan eca lmi 3 3 3 
Vanuatu eap lmi   1 1 
Venezuela lac umi 3 4 3 
Vietnam, Socialist Republic of  eap lmi 3 3 3 
Yemen mena lmi 3 4 4 





Yemen, South mena li    
Yugoslavia eca     
Zambia ssa lmi  3 3 
Zimbabwe ssa li  4 3 
 
Sources:  
Wood, Reed M. and Mark Gibney. "Political Terror Scale" Political Terror Scale. 
February 21, 2015. Accessed February 27, 2015. http://politicalterrorscale.org/about.php. 
Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and Their Global Reprecutions, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012 








Appendix 2 - Combined International Telecommunication Union Penetration Rate, 
Freedom House Internet Policy Freedom Rating 
 




Access at Home 
FH Internet Policy 
Grade 
Notes 
Andorra 74.3 Not rated   
Antigua and Barbuda 40 Not rated   
Argentina 47.5 Free   
Australia 82.7 Free   
Austria 80.9 Not rated   
Bahamas No data     
Barbados 51 Not rated   
Belgium 80 Not rated   
Belize No data     
Benin 1.4 Not rated   
Botswana No data     





Bulgaria 53.7 Not rated   
Canada 81.5 Not rated   
Cape Verde 20.3 Not rated   
Chile 40.9 Not rated   
Costa Rica 46.7 Not rated   
Croatia 64.6 Not rated   
Cyprus 64.7 Not rated   
Czech Rep 72.6 Not rated   
Denmark 92.7 Not rated   
Dominica No data     
Dominican Rep 19.6 Not rated   
El Salvador 12.7 Not rated   
Estonia 80.3 Free   
Finland 89.2 Not rated   
France 81.7 Free   
Germany 87.7 Free   
Ghana 11 Not rated   
Greece 56.3 Not rated   
Grenada No data     
Guyana No data     
Hungary 71.5 Free   
Iceland 96.4 Free   




Ireland 82.4 Not rated   
Israel 70.3 Not rated   





Jamaica 21.3 Not rated   
Japan 86.2 Free   
Kiribati No data     
Latvia 71.6 Not rated   
Lesotho No data     
Liechtenstein No data     
Lithuania 64.7 Not rated   
Luxembourg 94.5 Not rated   
Malta 78.8 Not rated   
Marshall Islands No data     
Mauritius 39.2 Not rated   
Micronesia No data     
Monaco No data     
Mongolia 14 Not rated   
Montenegro 55 Not rated   
Namibia 10 Not rated   
Nauru No data     
Netherlands 94.6 Not rated   
New Zealand 76.8 Not rated   
Norway 94.3 Not rated   
Palau No data     
Panama 30.5 Not rated   
Peru 20.2 Not rated   
Poland 71.9 Not rated   
Portugal 62.3 Not rated   
Romania 58.1 Not rated   
St Kitts 60.3 Not rated   
St Lucia 34.9 Not rated   
St Vincent No data     
Samoa No data     
San Marino No data     
Sao Tome No data     
Senegal 4.5 Not rated   
Serbia 40.2 Not rated   
Slovakia 77.9 Not rated   
Slovenia 75.6 Not rated   
South Africa 33.9 Free   




Spain 69.8 Not rated   
Suriname 17.3 Not rated   
Sweden 92.6 Not rated   
Switzerland 80.7 Not rated   
Taiwan No data     
Tonga No data     
Trinidad and Tobago No data     





United Kingdom 88.4 Free   
United States 71.7 Free   
Uruguay 48.4 Not rated   
Vanuatu 3.5 Not rated   
 
Sources:  
"Measuring the Information Society Report, 2014." International Telecommunication 
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